About the Club
The Philosophy Club is composed of students interested in philosophy who come together to learn about and discuss informally philosophical topics of interest. The Club runs hand in hand with the Auburn chapter of Phi Sigma Tau and is open to every student who has broad philosophical interests and a desire to participate and contribute to the philosophical life of the group.
Some of our past topics have included Aesthetics, Wittgenstein, Kant, Continental and Analytical Philosophy, The Emotions, Love and Marriage, Topics in Philosophy of Mind, Basic Action and Political Philosophy. In addition to those meetings, the club often has a Film and Philosophy Series (where we watch films and talk about them), and it meets regularly prior to AUPS meetings (i.e., the philosophy colloquia) to discuss informally the paper presented at the colloquium that day. The club is the host and the organizer of a popular series of philosophical panel discussions at the local cafe, ‘Momma Mocha's’. Finally the club regularly travels to regional and national philosophical conventions.
Membership in the club is twofold:
- Full members in the Philosophy Honors Society Phi Sigma Tau, who meet requirements for the society and have paid the sign-up fee.
- Full members who do not wish to be inducted into the society but wish to participate in the club.
Purposes of the Club
The Philosophy Club is dedicated to:
- Serving as a means of recognizing students who have achieved high scholarship and personal interest in philosophy.
- Promoting students' interest in research and advanced study in philosophy and its cognate fields.
- Providing opportunities for the preparation and critical discussion of student and faculty papers of philosophical interest.
- Encouraging a professional and friendly spirit among those who have displayed interest and ability in philosophy.
- Providing opportunities for informal philosophical and personal exchange between students and faculty.
- Creating a forum where both students and faculty feel philosophically inspired
For more information, to join the club, or any of the club activities, you are welcome to contact the philosophy club
March 1: Ralph DiFranco (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00 pm
“When Derogatory Language Goes Viral”, co-authored with Andrew Morgan (University of Alabama, Birmingham)
March 22: Peter Forrest (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm
"The Limits of Perceptual Phenomenal Content", There is an ongoing debate in philosophy of mind and epistemology about whether perceptual experience only represents those “thin” features of our environment that are apprehended by our senses--colors, shapes, sounds, and so on--or whether, in addition to these, at least some perceptual experiences represent more complex, “thick” properties such as natural, artifactual, and social kinds. In this talk I articulate and defend a novel argument against the thick view.
March 28: Panel on Free Will at Momma Mocha's on Gay St. at 5:00pm. Speakers include Professors Michael Bertrand, Howard Hewitt, Jennifer Lockhart, Sarah Richling, and Ziming Song.
April 26: David de Bruijn (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00 pm
August 24: Keren Gorodeisky (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"On Liking Aesthetic Value" - We often describe our responses to films, novels, songs, buildings, landscapes, gardens, and other aesthetically valuable objects in terms of feelings: we “hate” them or “love” them, “admire” them, “enjoy” them, “detest” them, or find that they “leave us cold.” Most often, we communicate our aesthetic responses in terms of our likes and dislikes. Tradition has a succinct explanation of this way of speaking: aesthetic value is essentially connected to feeling, particularly to a certain kind of liking orpleasure. Is that true? Should we endorse a non-contingent connection between aesthetic value and a feeling of liking or pleasure? Call this The Affective Question.
September 7: Chris Buckman (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"Sovereignty in Levinas and Hobbes" - In the preface to Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas asks whether philosophical lucidity requires “catching sight of the permanent possibility of war,” engaging with the claim that the threat of violence grounds the moral order. Surely one of his unnamed interlocutors here is Thomas Hobbes, who reduces morality to a function of positive law and argues that subjects must transfer all rights to an absolute sovereign to escape the war of all against all. This paper aims to make explicit Levinas’s critique of Hobbes. Both thinkers explain their theories of sovereignty through interpretation of the biblical passage 1 Samuel 8. The explication of this connection sharpens our understanding of Levinas’s political philosophy.
September 21: Mike Bertrand (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"Two Concepts of Metaphysical Grounding" - The idea that some things ground, and so depend, on others looms large in contemporary metaphysics. Throughout its rapidly growing literature, it is widely assumed both that there is a single grounding relation doing the work we require, and that this relation is systematically analogous to causation. I argue for the existence of grounding double prevention cases and I claim that these cases reveal an intractable tension between these assumptions and other plausible claims about grounding. I think that we can best resolve the tension by giving up the assumption that there is a single grounding relation.
October 19: Alan Baker (Swarthmore) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"Do Mathematical Objects Play Any Epistemic Role?" - Mathematical platonists believe that abstract mathematical objects exist and that our core mathematical claims, such as 5 + 7 = 12, are literally true descriptions of these objects. In several books and papers, Jody Azzouni has formulated a challenge to platonism that he calls “The Epistemic Role Puzzle.” Azzouni argues that mathematical abstracta play no epistemic role in mathematical practice, hence we ought not to believe in their existence. In this paper, I evaluate Azzouni’s argument and connect it to various other contemporary epistemological arguments concerning mathematics. I conclude that a viable epistemological role for mathematical objects can be found if we move beyond pure mathematics and into the application of mathematics in science.
October 26: Mike Milona (Auburn) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"Sentimental Perceptualism and the Armchair: A Sketch of a Comprehensive Moral Epistemology" - We seem to be able to acquire ethical knowledge by mere reflection, or "from the armchair." But how? This question is especially pressing for proponents of sentimental perceptualism, which is the view that ethical knowledge is rooted in affective experiences just as empirical knowledge is rooted in perception. But while empirical knowledge seems partially explained by causal relations between perceptions and properties in the world, in armchair ethical inquiry, the relevant normative properties are typically not even present. This paper shows how sentimental perceptualists can nevertheless provide a causal explanation of our reflective ethical knowledge.
November 2: Nick Wiltsher (Antwerp) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm
Auburn Aesthetics Forum - "Aesthetic Norms and the Construction of Gender Kinds" - It's generally agreed that genders are social kinds: existent, persistent categories constituted by culture and practice. An ontology of genders picks out social practices that are criterial of kind membership. Some such ontologies are explanatory or epistemic: they say how "common knowledge'' of entrenched social roles creates gender categories with causal substance (e.g. Mallon 2016). Some are normative: they say how practices of discrimination create gender hierarchies (e.g. Haslanger 2012). The aim of this paper is to articulate and explicate an aesthetic ontology of genders. This is intended as neither the mild claim that genders have aesthetic aspects, nor the wild claim that genders are fundamentally and essentially aesthetic kinds. Rather, I argue that aesthetic norms are implicitly in play in both epistemic and normative ontologies of gender, and that the practices criterial of kind membership on both accounts are often fundamentally aesthetic. This being so, we can see more clearly how different ontologies of genders can be complementary: epistemic and normative ontologies are united by consideration of aesthetic ontology. I conclude with some thoughts about the ramifications of this conclusion for "ameliorative projects'' directed at the eradication of gender discrimination.
November 8: Katharina Nieswandt (Concordia) in Mell 2550 at 4:00pm.
"Beyond Frontier Town: Private Property and Justice in Complex Economies" - The theories of Locke, Hume and Kant dominate contemporary philosophical discourse on property rights. This is particularly true of applied ethics, where these theories are used to settle issues from biotech patents to managerial obligations. I argue that this development is unfortunate because within these theories, the usual criticisms of private property aren’t even as much as intelligible. Locke, Hume and Kant, I attempt to show, develop claims about property considering people in a state of nature (a sort of ’frontier town’) and then apply these claims to a complex economy. This inference, I argue, has two problems: First, the two economies differ in important respects, so that very different claims about desert, fairness and social consequences will be plausible. Second, we’ll be considering the wrong kind of property: In Frontier Town, there only is self-sustenance property. Critics, however, object to private property in factors of production because they associate only this kind of property with systemic exploitation and an oppressive social order. I conclude that Frontier Town theories are unlikely to illuminate property issues in real economies.
November 9: Ulf Hlobil (Concordia) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"The Taking Condition and the Guise of the Good" - Aquinas famously distinguishes between human actions, which are the result of practical inference, and mere actions of humans, which are not the result of practical inference (ST, Ia-IIae, q1a1). Using that distinction, I argue that human actions are always performed under the Guide of the Good. To that end, I draw on Boghossian’s Taking Condition for inference, which says that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion and draws her conclusion because of that fact. First, I use the Taking Condition to argue that human action requires that the agent takes her premises, i.e. her reasons, to speak in favor of her action and performs her action because of that fact. I argue in a second step that actions are good, i.e. have moral worth, if they are done for good reasons, i.e. for reasons that support them. Putting both points together, it follows that human action requires that the agent takes something to be the case that implies that her action is good. That is the version of the Guise of the Good that I defend. It compares favorably to other prominent versions of the Guise of the Good.
November 30: Philip Atkins (Temple) in Ross 136 at 3:00pm.
"The Varieties of Russellianism" - Russellianism is the view that the meaning of a proper name is the individual designated by the name. Together with other plausible assumptions, Russellianism entails the following: Sentences containing proper names express Russellian propositions, which involve the individual designated by the name as a direct constituent, and which can be represented as sets of individuals and properties. Moreover, as they occur in ordinary belief reports, ‘that’-clauses designate Russellian propositions. Such belief reports are true if and only if the subject of the belief report bears the belief relation to the proposition designated by the ‘that’-clause. In defending this doctrine, some Russellians appeal to propositional guises, which, roughly speaking, are ways of grasping propositions (see, for example, Nathan Salmon’s influential Frege’s Puzzle). However, some Russellians don’t appeal to such entities (see, for example, Jonathan Berg’s recent Direct Belief). In this paper, I explain the varieties of Russellianism and then argue for Modest Russellianism: Believing a Russellian proposition is essentially mediated by guises, so that an agent can’t believe a Russellian proposition without standing in some appropriate relation to both the proposition and a guise. Nonetheless, guises don’t feature in the semantics of ordinary belief reports, so that an adequate account of the meaning of such belief reports needn’t invoke guises.
Philosophy club's previous events:
Last Updated: March 28, 2019