Auburn University Philosophical Society: Ulf Hlobil (Concordia)
Friday, November 9, 2018
Ross Hall | 136
Free and open to the public.
"The Taking Condition and the Guise of the Good"
Ulf Hlobil (Concordia), 3pm, November 9th
Aquinas famously distinguishes between human actions, which are the result of practical inference, and mere actions of humans, which are not the result of practical inference (ST, Ia-IIae, q1a1). Using that distinction, I argue that human actions are always performed under the Guide of the Good. To that end, I draw on Boghossian’s Taking Condition for inference, which says that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion and draws her conclusion because of that fact. First, I use the Taking Condition to argue that human action requires that the agent takes her premises, i.e. her reasons, to speak in favor of her action and performs her action because of that fact. I argue in a second step that actions are good, i.e. have moral worth, if they are done for good reasons, i.e. for reasons that support them. Putting both points together, it follows that human action requires that the agent takes something to be the case that implies that her action is good. That is the version of the Guise of the Good that I defend. It compares favorably to other prominent versions of the Guise of the Good.
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