Monopolistic Competition and Quality Innovation with Variable Demand Elasticity

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Monopolistic Competition and Quality Innovation with Variable Demand Elasticity

Gilad Sorek†

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Abstract

I study product-quality innovation under monopolistic competition with variable demand elasticity preferences and variable marginal cost. I characterize the free-entry equilibrium and the market size effect on product quality and markups. I then compare these results with the ones obtained in related studies of markets with process innovation and show that the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends on innovation type. Lastly, I show that the normative properties of the market equilibrium depend solely on the preferences characteristics, as in the canonical monopolistic competition framework with no innovation.

**JEL Classification**: L-1, O-30.

**Key words**: Quality Innovation, Variable Demand Elasticity, Monopolistic Competition.

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†I have benefited from comments by participants in the EARIE 2023 conference.
1 Introduction

The study of product-quality innovation has been central to both theoretical and empirical research on industrial organization, economic growth, and international trade. Large parts of this literature rely on the monopolistic competition framework proposed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Constant Demand Elasticity (CDE). A recent growing research body has been studying the implications of more general preferences specifications, with Variable Demand Elasticity (VDE), to market outcomes. A key subject to be readdressed in these analyses is the effect of market size on competitive pressure measures, such as markups and market concentration, which are neutralized under the CDE specification. The present study contributes to this literature an analysis of quality innovation under monopolistic competition, with the VDE additive preferences studied by Zhelobodko et al. (2012). The preference for product quality is introduced into the direct per-variety function as a factor over the utilized quantity, which is standard in Schumpeterian growth models.

Within this framework, I characterize the free-entry equilibrium conditions and the following market-size effects on market outcomes: product quality increases (decreases) with market size if demand elasticity decreases (increases) with consumption level, whereas the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends on the firm’s cost structure. Namely, markups increase (decrease) with market size if the elasticities of the production cost and the innovation cost decrease (increase) with output level and quality provision, respectively. I then generalize these results to case where the marginal cost of production increases with product quality provision and compare them with the ones obtained in related works by Bykadorov and Kokovin (2017) that study process innovation in the same framework employed here, and by Vives (2008) that studies process innovation in oligopolistic market. I find that the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends on innovation type, that is even with the same production cost and innovation cost elasticities, market size may have different effect on equilibrium markups under product quality innovation and process innovation. Lastly, I show that the normative properties of the market equilibrium are determined solely by consumers’ preferences characteristics, consistently with Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) original insight from their analysis of monopolistic competition with no innovation.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model market. Section 3 characterizes the free-entry equilibrium and the market size effects. Section 4

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1 Hereafter, I will refer to the CES specification mostly as "CDE".

2 See for example Zhelobodko et al. (2012), Bertoletti and Etro (2015, 2016, 2021), and Matsuyama and Ushchev (2022).

3 As in Grossman and Helpman (1991) canonical Schumpeterian ("Quality Ladders") growth model.
discusses the main results in comparison with the current literature. Section 5 presents the welfare analysis, and Section 6 concludes this study.

2 The Model

The market is populated with \( L \) identical agents, that are both workers and consumers. Each worker supplies one labor unit. The wage is normalized to one and is the workers’ sole income. Workers spend their income on differentiated consumption goods, "varieties", which are provided by \( m \) identical producers under monopolistic competition.

2.1 Preferences and consumer’s optimization

The consumer’s preferences are represented by the VDE utility function studied in Zhelobodko et al. (2012):

\[
U = \int_{0}^{m} u(c_i) \, di
\]  

The per-variety subutility function \( u(\bullet) \) is concave and thrice differentiable, and the consumption stream derived from each variety, \( c_i \), is given by \( c_i = q_i \cdot x_i \), where \( x_i \) and \( q_i \) designate the utilized quantity and quality, respectively. Standard consumer’s utility-maximization, subject to the unit labor income and the given product prices, yields the per-variety inverse demand function\(^4\)

\[
p_i = \frac{q_i \cdot u'(q_i \cdot x_i)}{\lambda}
\]

From (2), I derive the product-variety demand elasticity and its absolute value, denoted \( \varepsilon_{x,p} \) and \( s_i(c_i) \), respectively.\(^5\)

\[
s_i(c_i) \equiv |\varepsilon_{x,p}| = -\frac{u'(c_i)}{c_i \cdot u''(c_i)}
\]

I will use the abbreviations "DDE" and "IDE" for decreasing and increasing demand elasticity, respectively. For equal consumption levels from all products, equation (3) also defines the elasticity of substitution across varieties.\(^6\) The monopolistic competition under

\(^4\) \( \lambda \) is the Lagrange multiplier from the consumer’s optimization.
\(^5\) I will use Epsilon, \( \varepsilon \), to denote all different elasticities considered below.
\(^6\) For \( u(c_i) = c_i^\ell \) equation (2) reduces back to the CDE case, with demand elasticity \( s = \frac{1}{1-\ell} \).
\(^7\) Zhelobodko et al. (2012) term the inverse of demand elasticity "Relative Love for Variety", \( RLV_i \equiv -\frac{c_i u''(c_i)}{u'(c_i)} = \frac{1}{s_i(c_i)} > 0 \), which corresponds the Arrow-Pratt measure of Relative Risk Aversion. If demand
study is viable if demand elasticity is finite and greater than one, \( s_i \in (1, \infty) \).

### 2.2 Technologies and profit-maximization

Labor is the sole input for production and for quality innovation. The firm’s output, \( y \equiv x \cdot L \), is subject to a fixed cost, \( F \), and a convex variable cost function, \( vc(y) \), with \( vc'(y) \), \( vc''(y) > 0 \), and \( vc(0) = 0 \). Therefore, the total cost of production is \( tc(y) = F + vc(y) \). Product-quality enhancement is subject to a convex innovation (R&D) cost function, \( f(q) \), with \( f'(q), f''(q) > 0 \). Each firm maximizes the following profit function by choosing its and output level - through the choice of \( x_i \) - and product quality:

\[
\Pi_i = \frac{q_i u'(q_i \cdot x_i)}{\lambda} x_i L - vc(x_i L) - F - f(q_i) \tag{4}
\]

The first-order condition for maximizing (4) with respect to \( x_i \) reads\(^8\)

\[
q_i \cdot u'(q_i \cdot x_i^*) + x_i^* \cdot q_i^2 u''(q_i \cdot x_i^*) = \lambda mc(x_i^* L) \tag{5}
\]

Combining condition (5) with the inverse demand function (2) yields the standard monopolistic pricing rule

\[
p_i^* = \frac{mc(x_i^* L)}{1 + \frac{c_i u''(c_i^*)}{w'(c_i^*)}} = \mu_i^* mc(x_i^* L) \tag{5a}
\]

Where \( \mu_i \equiv \frac{s_i(c_i)}{s_i(c_i) - 1} \) corresponds the markup over the marginal cost. For DDE (IDE), the profit-maximizing markup \( \mu_i \) increases (decreases) with individual consumption level \( c_i \). The profit-maximizing quality satisfies the following first order condition

\[
u'(q_i^* \cdot x_i) + x_i^* \cdot q_i^2 u''(q_i^* \cdot x_i) x_i L = f'(q_i^*) \tag{6}
\]

and combining condition (6) with (5) reveals a positive relation between the profit-elasticity decreases (increases) with consumption level the relative love for variety increases (decreases) with consumption level: as demand elasticity increases (decreases) across product varieties, so does the equilibrium elasticity of substitution and, thereby, the consumer’s gain from ("love for") having more varieties increases.

\(^8\)The profit-maximizing quantity and quality are denoted with an asterisk superscript.

\(^9\)Condition (5) the is standard profit-maximizing condition that equalizes marginal revenue and marginal cost: \( p_i + \frac{dp_i}{dx_i} x_i = mc \). For DDE preferences the marginal revenue decreases with output and having \( \frac{c_i u''(c_i)}{u'(c_i)} > -2 \) guarantees a decreasing marginal revenue function also for IDE.
maximizing product quality and total and per-consumer supply

\[ x_i^* mc(x_i^*L) = \frac{q_i^* f'(q_i^*)}{L} \]  \hspace{1cm} (6)

Condition (7) implies that individual consumption level for each variety can written as

\[ c_i \equiv q_i x_i = \frac{(q_i^*)^2 f'(q_i^*)}{mc(x_i^*L)L} \]  \hspace{1cm} (7a)

and the firm’s total supply \( y_i^* \) also increases with quality provision:

\[ y_i^* mc(y_i^*) = q_i^* f'(q_i^*) \]  \hspace{1cm} (7b)

For later use, the latter condition can be also written as

\[ \frac{tc(y^*)}{f(q^*)} = \frac{\varepsilon_{f,q^*}}{\varepsilon_{tc,y^*}} \iff \frac{y_i^*}{q_i^*} = \frac{f'(q_i^*)}{mc(y_i^*)} \]  \hspace{1cm} (7c)

3 Equilibrium

Substituting the profit-maximizing price (5a) into (4) yields the following zero-profit expression

\[ \mu_i mc(x_iL)x_iL = vc(x_iL) + f(q_i) + F \]  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Combining the zero-profit condition (8) with the optimality condition (7), yields the symmetric free-entry equilibrium condition\(^{10}\)

\[ \mu^e \equiv \frac{s(\varepsilon^e)}{s(\varepsilon^e)} - 1 = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,q}} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{tc,y}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (8)

In equilibrium, the sum of the inverse cost elasticities is equal to the markup, which is also the inverse of the revenue elasticity with respect to quality and quantity: \( \mu^e = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{R,q}} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{R,q}} \). By (7a) and (7b), both sides of (9) can be implicitly expressed in terms of product quality, with \( \frac{\partial c}{\partial q}, \frac{\partial y}{\partial q} > 0 \). Given market size, \( L \), for DDE (IDE) preferences the left side in (9) increases (decreases) with \( q \). The shape of right side in (9) depends on the shape of \( \phi(q) \equiv \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,q}} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{tc,y(q)}} \). The solution for (9) defines the equilibrium product quality, and the

\[^{10}\text{The symmetric-equilibrium outcomes are denoted with the "e" superscript, and the product variety index "i" is dropped}.\]

\[^{11}\text{Having } \varepsilon_{f,q}^e + \varepsilon_{vc,y}^e > \varepsilon_{vc,y}^e \varepsilon_{f,q}^e \iff \varepsilon_{f,q}^e > \varepsilon_{vc,y}^e \text{ is necessary for the right side of (9) to be greater than one and secure positive equilibrium markups.}\]
corresponding equilibrium markups - on the left side of the equation. By (7a), the market size works to decrease individual consumption level from each variety. Therefore, in the case of DDE (IDE) a market size increase shifts the left side of (9) downward (upward). Consequently, the equilibrium product quality increases (decreases). With DDE, the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends on whether the right side in (9), \( \phi(q) \), decreases or increases with product quality. In the case of IDE, an equilibrium exists only if the right side of (9) decreases with product quality and, therefore, equilibrium markups increase with market size.

**Proposition 1** Product quality increases (decreases) with market size if demand elasticity decreases (increases) with consumption level. The market size effect on markups depends on the shape of the elasticities of the production cost and innovation cost: if both decrease (increase) with output level and quality provision, respectively, markups increase (decrease) with market size.

Subject to the equilibrium condition (9), the labor resources-uses constraint defines the product variety span offered in the market, which is also the number of operating firms:

\[
L = m^e \cdot (vc(y^e) + F + f(q^e)) \implies m^e = \frac{L}{vc(y^e) + F + f(q^e)}
\]  

(9)

For IDE, market size negatively affects equilibrium product-quality, \( q^e \), and per-variety supply, \( y^e \). Therefore, in this case the market size increases product variety span and decreases market concentration, measured by \( \frac{L}{m} \). For DDE, the market size works to increase the firm’s output and R&D effort and thus its effect on product variety span is ambiguous. Yet, the latter result can be refined by combining (10) with (9) to obtain

\[
m^e = \frac{L}{\mu^e q^e f'(q^e)}
\]  

(10)

Market size changes shift the left side of (9) through their effect on \( x_i \), according to condition (7). As this first effect dominates the equilibrium changes, it is guaranteed that the factor \( \frac{L}{q^e f'(q^e)} \) in equation (11) increases with market size, even if the equilibrium product-quality increases. This inference implies that if the equilibrium markup does not increase (decrease) with market size, product variety span (market concentration) increases. The results obtained thus far are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Market size effects for constant production cost elasticity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demand type</th>
<th>DDE</th>
<th>IDE</th>
<th>CDE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs-structure</td>
<td>(\frac{d\phi}{dq} &gt; 0)</td>
<td>(\frac{d\phi}{dq} &lt; 0)</td>
<td>(\frac{d\phi}{dq} = 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{\partial y^e}{\partial L})</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{\partial \mu^e}{\partial L})</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>&lt; 0</td>
<td>= 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\frac{\partial m^e}{\partial L})</td>
<td>(\leq 0)</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
<td>&gt; 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4 Discussion

I turn now to compare the results obtained above with the ones derived in closely related studies. Zhelobodko et al. (2012) study monopolistic competition with VDE and no innovation. After normalizing product quality to one and abstracting from innovation cost, the equilibrium condition (9) modifies to

\[
\frac{s(y^e/L)}{s(y^e/L) - 1} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,Y}} \iff \varepsilon_{R,Y} = \varepsilon_{T,Y}^e
\]  

(12a)

Market size changes shift the right side of (12a) as in equation (9). However, unlike in the present analysis, in Zhelobodko et al. (2012) the cost elasticity is assumed to be increasing. Consequently, the market size has contradicting effects on the firm’s output and markup in equilibrium, unlike here. Bykadorov and Kokovin (2017) derive a similar equilibrium condition for process innovation in the framework of Zhelobodko et al. (2012), which - in terms of the notation used here - reads

\[
\frac{s(y^e/L)}{s(y^e/L) - 1} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,Y} + \varepsilon_{Y}}
\]  

(12b)

\[\text{Zhelobodko et al. (2012) write the equilibrium condition, in terms of } x. \text{ Under this presentation of the equilibrium condition, it is the right side of the equation that shifts with market size - see equation (10) on page 2772, there.}\]

\[\text{See in the bottom of page 2773, there.}\]

\[\text{See equation (18) on page 668, there. The characterization of the market size effects based on this equilibrium equation is summarized in Table 1 on page 670, there.}\]
Comparing the equilibrium conditions (12c) and (9) reveals that under both innovation types, the effect of market size on the firm’s output and R&D investment depends solely on whether the preferences imply DDE or IDE, and the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends on the firm’s cost structure. However, the firm’s cost structure presents differently in the two equilibrium conditions: on the right side of (9) it the sum of inverse elasticities of innovation cost and production cost, and on the right side of (12b) the calculated elasticity is with respect to sum of production cost and innovation cost - written in terms of the firm’s optimal output. Therefore, the expressions on the right sides of (9) and (12b) may have different slope signs, even for the same production cost and innovation cost elasticities expressions\(^{15}\). Consequently the market size effect on equilibrium markups not only on the firms’ cost structure, but also on the innovation type. For example, consider the case with constant innovation cost elasticity, and constant production cost elasticity.\(^{16}\) With these cost elasticities the right side of condition (9) is constant, implying that equilibrium markup are neutral to market size for quality innovation. Yet, the right side of condition (12b) could be upward or downward slopping implying a positive or negative market size effect on equilibrium markups for process innovation (depending also on demand type, in accordance with Table 1).

Vives (2008) studies process innovation under oligopolistic competition with differentiated products. With the notation used here, Vives’ (2008) free-entry equilibrium condition is given by\(^{17}\)

\[
\frac{\mu^e - 1}{\mu^e} = \frac{F + f^e}{F + f^e + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{mc,f}^{e}}} \iff \mu^e = \frac{\varepsilon_{mc,f}^{e} \left( f^e + F \right) + 1}{\varepsilon_{mc,f}^{e}}
\]  

(12c)

where \(\varepsilon_{mc,f}^{e}\) is the elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to the firm’s R&D spending. The equilibrium condition (9) can be written in a similar fashion to (12c), after applying equation (7b), and then applying (7a) for the case of constant marginal cost - as assumed by Vives (2008):

\[
\mu^e = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,q}^{e}} \frac{f^e + F}{f^e} + 1
\]  

(12d)

The elasticity term \(\varepsilon_{mc,f}^{e}\) in (12d) corresponds the inverse innovation cost elasticity in (12c), because it represents the relation between the marginal cost and the R&D effort aimed to reduce it. Here, again, the effect of market size on the firm’s output and R&D

\(^{15}\) As the sum of the elasticities of two functions is different from the elasticity of the the sum of those functions.

\(^{16}\) As in the case of no fix production cost and constant marginal cost which is assumed by Bykadorov and Kokovin (2017).

\(^{17}\) See the first equation from the top of page 438, there.
investment depends solely on whether demand elasticity decreases or increased with output, and the market size effect on equilibrium markups depends also on the firm’s cost structure - but not in the same way.

Lastly, consider the possibility that a higher quality-product is produced with a higher marginal cost, that is \( vc = vc(y, q) \) and \( \frac{\partial^2 vc}{\partial y \partial q} > 0 \), as in Bertoletti and Etro (2015) and Fan et al. (2020), though their analyses abstract the innovation cost. In this case this case, the equilibrium condition (9) generalizes to:

\[
\mu^e = \frac{1 - \frac{\varepsilon_{vc,q}}{\varepsilon_{vc,y}}}{\varepsilon_{f,q}} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{tc,y}} \tag{12e}
\]

The benchmark analysis assumes \( \varepsilon_{vc,q} = 0 \). So long as the added term \( \frac{\varepsilon_{vc,q}}{\varepsilon_{vc,y}} \) does not change the slope of the right side of (12e), all the results presented on Table 1 still hold. Nonetheless, the increased production cost of better-quality products implies lower quality innovation in equilibrium, as expected by common economic intuition, whereas its effect on equilibrium markups depends on demand type: for DDE (IDE) the decreased equilibrium quality is companioned with lower (higher) markups.

5 Welfare

The efficient market outcomes are defined by the allocation of the available labor between production and quality innovation, over a feasible product variety span, to maximize the utility function (2). The labor resources-uses constraint (8), can be also written as \( m = \frac{L}{vc(y) + f(q) + F} \), and plugging this expression into (2) yields the welfare objective function

\[
U = \frac{L u(q \cdot x)}{vc(xL) + f(q) + F} \tag{11}
\]

The first order condition with respect to \( q \) and \( x \) are given in equation (14a) and (14b), respectively:

\[18\] Whereas their setup seems to be an adequate representation of producers’ choice over its product quality (characteristics) from an existing set of already developed products, it lacks the notion of the costly innovation process that is associated with forming improved product quality.

\[19\] Bertoletti and Etro (2015) study indirect additively separable utility function and product quality is introduced into preferences such that it does not affect demand elasticity.

\[20\] With zero fix production cost and constant marginal cost (with respect to output), as assumed by Etro (2015) and Fan et al. (2020), condition (12d) reads \( \mu^e = \frac{1 - \varepsilon_{mc.q}}{\varepsilon_{f,q}} + 1 \), and Having \( \varepsilon_{mc.q} < 1 \) is necessary for insure the existence of equilibrium with positive markups, i.e. \( \mu^e > 1 \).

\[21\] The welfare maximizing values are denoted with a double asterisk superscript.
\[
x u' (q^*x) (tc(x \cdot L) + f(q^*)) = f'(q^*) u(q^*x) \quad (14a)
\]

\[
qu' (q \cdot x^*) (vc(x^*L) + f(q)) = L \cdot tc'(x^*L)u(q \cdot x^*) \quad (14b)
\]

Dividing (14a) by (14b) reveals that the ratio between the welfare-maximizing output and quality for each variety coincides with the market equilibrium’s that is given in (7b):

\[
y^* tc'(y^*) = q^* f'(q^*) \Rightarrow \frac{\varepsilon_{tc,y^*}}{\varepsilon_{f,q^*}} = \frac{f(q^*)}{tc(y^*)} \quad (12)
\]

Combining (15) with (14a) yields the following condition for the welfare-maximizing quality provision

\[
\frac{1}{\varepsilon_{u,c^*}} = \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{tc,y^*}} + \frac{1}{\varepsilon_{f,q^*}} \quad (13)
\]

The right side in (16) is identical to its counterpart in the equilibrium condition (9). However, the left side in (16) is the inverse elasticity of the subutility function whereas in equation (9) it is the inverse of the revenue elasticity, defined by demand elasticity. The former is greater (smaller) than the latter if \(1 + \frac{c u''(c)}{u'(c)} - \varepsilon_{u,c} \) is positive (negative), which holds if \(\varepsilon_{u,c} \) increases (decreases) with consumption level:

\[
\frac{d\varepsilon_{u,c}}{dc} = \frac{\varepsilon_{u,c}}{c} \left[ 1 + \frac{c u''(c)}{u'(c)} - \varepsilon_{u,c} \right].
\]

**Proposition 2** If the elasticity of the subutility, \(\varepsilon_{u,c} \), decreases with consumption level the market equilibrium results in under-provision of product quality and quantity and over provision of product variety, compared with the social optimum. The converse is true if the elasticity of the subutility increases with consumption level.

These results are consistent with the ones presented first by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and apply also to the process innovation under monopolistic innovation studied by Bykadorov and Kokovin (2017).22

6 Conclusion

This study adds the analysis of product-quality innovation to the growing literature on monopolistic competition with variable demand elasticity. It characterizes the free-entry equilibrium and its welfare properties, and the effect of market size on market outcomes.

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22 See Section II on pp. 302-304 in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Section 4 on pp-671-673 in Bykadorov and Kokovin (2017).
Comparing the present results with the ones obtained in previous market analyses with process innovation reveals that the market size effect on equilibrium market depends on innovation type. The market analysis presented here can be used in more elaborate frameworks that study product quality innovation - in the dynamic frameworks of Schumpeterian growth models, and in multi-markets frameworks studied in the international trade realm.

References


