Understanding Why Fiscal Stimulus Can Fail through the Lens of the Survey of Professional Forecasters

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Understanding Why Fiscal Stimulus Can Fail through the Lens of the Survey of Professional Forecasters

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Abstract

This paper shows that fiscal policy in the U.S. has become ineffective due to lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. We present a New Keynesian model that generates strong output effects of government spending shocks only when monetary policy coordinates well with fiscal policy. Employing the post-war U.S. data, we report strong stimulus effects of fiscal policy during the pre-Volcker era, which rapidly dissipate when we shift the sample period to the post-Volcker era. Finding a negligible role of the real interest rate in the propagation of government spending shocks, we propose an alternative explanation using a sentiment channel. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show that forecasters tend to systematically overestimate real GDP growth in response to positive innovations in government spending when policies coordinate well with each other. On the other hand, they are likely to formulate pessimistic forecasts when the monetary authority maintains a hawkish stance that conflicts with the fiscal stimulus. The fiscal stimulus, under such circumstances, may generate consumer pessimism, which decreases private spending and ultimately weakens the output effects of fiscal policy. We also provide statistical evidence that confirms an important role of the sentiment channel under different regimes of policy coordination.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Time-varying Effectiveness; Policy Coordination; Sentiment; Survey of Professional Forecasters

JEL Classification: E32; E61; E62

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1 Introduction

The sluggish economic recovery from the recent Great Recession has triggered heated debates on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating private activity. One group of researchers reports significantly positive output effects of fiscal stimulus, which can be consistent with the New Keynesian macroeconomic model. However, such effects could be replicated only in heavily restricted models. See, among others, Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), Devereux et al. (1996), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2011), and Galí et al. (2007).

Many others, on the other hand, are skeptical about the effectiveness of fiscal policy. For instance, Ramey (2011) points out that expansionary government spending shocks tend to decrease consumption due to a negative wealth effect. See, among others, Aiyagari et al. (1992), Hall (1986), Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg et al. (1999), Burnside et al. (2004), Cavallo (2005), Mountford and Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2012), and Owyang et al. (2013).

Another interesting question is whether fiscal policy has nonlinear effects on output depending on the current state of the economy. For example, Fazzari et al. (2015), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), Mittnik and Semmler (2012), and Bachmann and Sims (2012) claim that fiscal policy tends to have a stronger output effect during times of slack, whereas Kim and Jia (2017), Owyang et al. (2013), and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) find no such evidence. On the other hand, Hall (2009) and Christiano et al. (2011) suggest that the government spending multiplier can be greater when the nominal interest rate is bounded at zero. Corsetti et al. (2012) and Ilzetzki et al. (2013) report some international evidence that the effectiveness of government stimulus depends on some country characteristics such as the exchange rate regime and public indebtedness.

In their recent work, Leeper et al. (2017) proposed an interesting theoretical framework that generates substantially weaker responses of private spending to expansionary fiscal policy shocks in an active monetary/passive fiscal policy regime (Regime M) than in a passive monetary/active fiscal policy regime (Regime F).\(^1\)

Motivated by their work, we evaluate the effectiveness of fiscal policy under different monetary and fiscal policy regimes. Finding no compelling empirical evidence of passive fiscal policy, however, we focus on the monetary policy stance that tends to change over time given the active stance of fiscal policy.\(^2\) We assume that the central bank maintains

\(^1\) An active monetary policy regime refers a case that the monetary authority responds to inflation aggressively. A passive fiscal policy regime means that dynamics of government spending has a strong feedback from rising government debt.

\(^2\) We observe the federal government deficit in 75 out of 89 years from 1929 to 2017, which is about 84%
a dovish policy stance that coordinates well with expansionary fiscal policy in regime D. In regime H, however, monetary policy makers respond aggressively to inflationary pressure, conflicting with fiscal stimulus. That is, we assume that fiscal and monetary policy are well coordinated only in regime D. Our simulation results demonstrate that private spending positively responds to the government spending shock in regime D, whereas it responds negatively in regime H, resulting in substantially weaker stimulating effects on the total output. In what follows, our theoretical model shows that the real interest rate plays a key role in generating qualitatively different output effects across the two regimes.

Employing the post-war U.S. macroeconomic data, we investigate the empirical validity of these predictions of our model. We report strong evidence of the time-varying effectiveness of fiscal policy with a possibility of structural breaks in the propagation mechanism of the government spending shock across time. Specifically, we observed strong stimulating effects of government spending on private economic activity in earlier sample periods when the Fed stayed accommodative, while government spending shocks tend to discourage economic activity in the private sector when the Fed shifted to a hawkish stance, conflicting with expansionary fiscal policy.

Although these findings are overall consistent with the predictions of our proposed model, we noticed a negligibly weak role of the real interest rate in propagating fiscal stimulus to economic activity, which is inconsistent with our benchmark New Keynesian model. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative explanation for the observed time-varying output effects of fiscal policy shocks using a sentiment channel. It should be noted, however that we are not the first to introduce the role of sentiment as one of potential drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations. See, among others, Hall (1993), Blanchard (1993), Cochrane (1994), Beaudry and Portier (2006, 2007), Bachmann and Sims (2012) and Kim and Jia (2017).

For this purpose, we investigate how market participants revise their economic prospects when they receive new information on the stance of fiscal policy through the lens of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data. We show that forecasters tend to over-predict GDP growth when monetary policy coordinates well with fiscal policy, while systemic under-predictions are likely to occur when the Fed adopts a hawkish stance. We view persistent over-predictions as a sign of optimism, while under-predictions reflect pessimistic economic prospects in the market.

We further investigate this conjecture by regressing five-quarter ahead forecasts of real GDP growth on one-quarter ahead forecasts of real government spending growth employing odds (FYFSGDA188S; FRED).
a fixed-size rolling window scheme. Results reveal strong positive correlations (optimism) for the pre-Volcker era, while we observed negative correlations (pessimism) when the stance of monetary policy became hawkish. These findings imply that time-varying responses in sentiment may explain the time-varying effectiveness of fiscal policy on private spending. In regime D, fiscal stimulus generates consumer optimism, which stimulates economic activity in the private sector. In regime H, however, it generates consumer pessimism, resulting in subsequent decreases in private spending, which ultimately weaken the effectiveness of fiscal policy. We also provide statistical evidence in favor of such views employing structural break tests by Hansen (1997, 2001).

Leeper et al. (2017) also demonstrate that fiscal policy can be less effective when the monetary authority stays hawkish. However, their contributions are mostly theoretical because their major findings are based on counterfactual analyses using the full sample period data. On the contrary, we provide historical evidence of the time-varying effects of fiscal stimulus for the post-war U.S. data. Furthermore, we suggest a sentiment channel as an alternative to the real interest rate channel to explain the output effects of fiscal policy under different policy regimes.

Perotti (2005) suggests similar evidence that fiscal policy became less effective in more recent sample periods using macroeconomic data from 5 OECD countries including the U.S. However, he fails to provide convincing explanations what caused such changes. Bilbiie et al. (2008) also report time-varying effects of fiscal stimulus, but they focus more on the role of different feedback rules of government spending as in Leeper et al. (2017). They suggest that financial market deregulation made it possible for households to smooth consumption, which makes fiscal policy less effective.³ It seems, however, that these arguments are at odds with the data. In effect, saving rates have substantially declined since the 1980's when deregulation began in the U.S.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports simulation results that highlight qualitatively different output effects of fiscal stimulus across regimes. We present our New Keynesian model in the Appendix. Section 3 presents our empirical models along with data descriptions. We demonstrate time-varying responses of our key economic variables to government spending shocks. We provide strong evidence of a weak role of the real interest rate in propagating fiscal stimulus over time. We then discuss a possibility of the existence of a sentiment channel as an alternative. Employing the SPF data, section 4 provides a novel statistical approach that extracts useful information on how market par-

³They argue that more savings instruments became available due to financial market deregulation, which helped households to act in line with the permanent income hypothesis.
participants revise their economic prospects when they receive new information on government spending. We show market agents become more optimistic in regime D in response to the government spending shock, while they become pessimistic in regime H, which helps explain weaker output effects of fiscal policy in regime H. Section 5 concludes.

2 Model Simulations

This section reports simulation results, obtained from a New Keynesian model that features external habit formation in consumption, variable capacity utilization, investment adjustment costs, and monopolistic competition in the production. Sticky prices and sticky wages are modeled using the framework of Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996). Government spending directly enters the household’s utility function as a complement to private consumption. As shown by Linnemann and Schabert (2004) and Leeper et al. (2017), this specification turns out to help reconcile theory and empirical evidence. Monetary authority is assumed to follow a Taylor rule, while fiscal rules are specified with a feedback to government debt as described in Leeper et al. (2017). Theoretical model specifications, calibration methods, and model solutions are discussed in Appendix including calibrated parameter values reported in Table 1.

To highlight the implications of policy coordination of monetary and fiscal policies, we define the following two regimes. In regime D, policy makers stay accommodative in the stance of both monetary and fiscal policy. The dovish central bank puts greater emphasis on output stabilization, thus responds only weakly to inflation to keep the balance between output and inflation stability. In regime H, however, the hawkish central bank prioritizes keeping inflationary pressure in check, which results in more aggressive responses to the inflation gap, conflicting with the fiscal stimulus of the government. In what follows, we demonstrate the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus critically hinges upon the stance of monetary policy. See the Appendix for more detailed description of our model.

Figure 1 displays simulated impulse-response functions (IRFs) of key macroeconomic variables to a 1% government spending shock under the two regimes, regime D (solid) and regime H (dashed). We observe persistently positive output effects of fiscal policy only in regime D, where the monetary authority maintains a dovish monetary policy stance in collaboration with the fiscal stimulus. Output and inflation both rise in response to the government spending shock, but the central bank raises the interest rate at a slower rate than inflation, resulting in a decrease in the real interest rate for about two years. Responses of the
private GDP also stay positive in the first two years until persistently positive consumption responses are dominated by the negative response of investment. The total GDP exhibits persistent, solid positive responses even when the private GDP responds negatively after the first two years, which implies that responses of public (government) spending dominate those of the private GDP.

On the other hand, we obtained substantially weaker output effects of fiscal policy in regime H, which sharply contrast with those in regime D. In response to the government spending shock, inflation rises more slowly than the nominal interest rate as the central bank raises the interest rate aggressively to curb inflation, maintaining a hawkish policy stance. Consequently, the real interest rate rises, crowding out investment, which results in immediate decreases in the private GDP. Private consumption responds positively, reflecting the complementarity between government spending and consumption. However, its positive responses are dominated by decreases in investment, which result in negative responses of the private GDP. The total GDP rises in the short-run, driven by increases in government spending, but eventually falls below zero due to substantial negative responses of the private GDP.

Overall, our simulation results demonstrate that the effectiveness of fiscal policy greatly hinges upon the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies. In the next section, we report strong empirical evidence of time-varying output effects of fiscal policy in the private sector using the post-war U.S. macroeconomic data. We found a very limited role of the real interest rate in the propagation mechanism of fiscal policy, which is at odds with the simulation results from our baseline New Keynesian model presented in this section. In what follows, we suggest a sentiment channel as an alternative to the real interest rate channel.

Figure 1 around here

3 The Empirics

This section presents our baseline empirical model for the U.S. post-war macroeconomic data. We report solid empirical evidence that supports time-varying output effects of fiscal policy.
3.1 The Empirical Model

We employ the following vector autoregressive (VAR) process of order \( p \).

\[
\mathbf{x}_t = \gamma' \mathbf{d}_t + \sum_{j=1}^{p} \mathbf{A}_j \mathbf{x}_{t-j} + \mathbf{C} \varepsilon_t, \tag{1}
\]

where

\[
\mathbf{x}_t = [g_t \ y_t \ z_t]',
\]

\( \mathbf{d}_t \) is a vector of deterministic terms that includes an intercept and up to quadratic time trend. \( \mathbf{C} \) denotes a lower-triangular matrix and \( \varepsilon_t \) is a vector of mutually orthonormal structural shocks, that is, \( E\varepsilon_t \varepsilon_t' = \mathbf{I} \). We are particularly interested in the \( j \)-period ahead orthogonalized impulse-response function (IRF) defined as follows.

\[
IRF_{k,j} = E(\mathbf{x}_{t+j}|\varepsilon_{k,t} = 1, \Omega_{t-1}) - E(\mathbf{x}_{t+j}|\Omega_{t-1}), \tag{2}
\]

where \( \varepsilon_{k,t} \) is the structural shock to the \( k \)-th variable in (1) that occurs at time \( t \). \( \Omega_{t-1} \) is the adaptive information set at time \( t - 1 \), that is, \( \Omega_j \supseteq \Omega_{j-1}, \forall j \).

\( g_t \) denotes federal government spending, which is used to identify the fiscal policy shock. We employ discretionary components of government spending, that is, federal consumption expenditures and gross investment. Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), \( g_t \) is ordered first in \( \mathbf{x}_t \), meaning that \( g_t \) is not contemporaneously affected by innovations in other variables within one quarter. This assumption is frequently employed in the current literature, because implementations of discretionary fiscal policy actions require Congressional approvals, which normally take more than one quarter.\(^4\)

\( y_t \) is the real per capita gross domestic product (GDP), but we also consider the private real GDP per capita (pgdp) for \( y_t \) to measure the stimulus effects of fiscal policy on private activity. In addition, we directly employ private spending variables for \( y_t \) such as private consumption (conm) and private investment (invt), all in real terms.

\( \mathbf{x}_t \) includes a vector of control variables from the money market \( \mathbf{z}_t = [\mathit{int}_t \ \mathit{mon}_t]', \) where \( \mathit{int}_t \) is the effective federal funds rate and \( \mathit{mon}_t \) is the log monetary base. These variables are ordered in the last block, because the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) can revise the stance of monetary policy by holding regular and emergency meetings whenever

\(^4\)Kim and Jia (2017) employed the government total expenditures that includes transfer payments in addition to the discretionary government consumption and investment spending. Since transfer payments have automatic stabilizers, they put \( g_t \) next to \( y_t \).
policy-makers deem it necessary. Note that $int_t$ is ordered before $mont_t$, because the Fed targets the interest rate, while the monetary base changes endogenously.

It is well known that econometric inferences from recursively identified VAR models may not be robust to alternative VAR ordering. It turns out that our empirical findings are not subject to such criticism as long as we are interested in the IRFs to the government spending ($gt$) shock, $IRF_{1,j}$. Given the location of $gt$, $IRF_{1,j}$ is numerically identical even if all variables next to $gt$ are randomly re-shuffled. See Christiano et al. (1999) for details.5

3.2 Data Descriptions

We obtained most data from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) website. Observations are quarterly frequency and span from 1960Q1 to 2017Q3.

$gt$ is federal consumption expenditures and gross investment (FGCE), which constitutes discretionary components of federal government expenditures. The private GDP ($pgdp_t$) is the total GDP ($gdp_t$; NGDP) minus total (federal and state & local) government consumption expenditures and gross investment (GCE). Consumption ($comm_t$) is total personal consumption expenditures on nondurables (PCND) and services (PCESV). Investment ($invt_t$) denotes private nonresidential fixed investment (PNFI). All spending variables are expressed in real per capita terms. That is, they are divided by the GDP deflator (GDPDEF) and by the civilian noninstitutional population (CNP16OV), then log-transformed.

The nominal interest rate ($int_t$) is the effective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS) divided by 100, which can be used to identify the monetary policy shock.6 $mont_t$ is the monetary base (BOGMBASE), expressed in natural logarithm. We also employ the ex post real interest rate in our VAR models, which equals $int_t$ minus the consumer price index (CPIAUCSL) based inflation.

Later, we augment our benchmark VAR model (1) with the (log) Index of Consumer Expectations ($sent_t$) to investigate the propagation mechanism of fiscal policy through shifts in sentiment. We obtained $sent_t$ from the University of Michigan’s Survey of Consumers database. $sent_t$ provides information on the level of consumer confidence about economic conditions in the near future. In addition to this forward-looking sentiment index, we experimented with the Current Conditions Index and the Index of Consumer Sentiment (combined

5Similarly, all response functions to monetary policy shocks are robust to alternative ordering given the location of monetary variables, $int_t$ and $mont_t$.

6We observed no evidence of structural breaks in the output effects of monetary policy. Results are available upon requests.
index), obtained from the same source. All three indices are highly correlated with each other, thus yield qualitatively similar empirical results.\footnote{Results are available from authors upon request.}

Also, we use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data to understand how market participants revise their forecasts of key macroeconomic variables. The median SPF forecasts data for relevant variables were obtained from the Philadelphia Fed website for the period between 1968Q4 and 2017Q3.\footnote{The mean SPF forecasts yielded qualitatively similar results.} There were 9 changes in the base year in the National Income and Product Account (NIPA) during this sample period. Some authors (Ramey (2011); Forni and Gambetti (2016)) used growth rates of the SPF forecasts without adjusting for these changes in the base year, which generates 9 outlier observations in the data. To prevent this, we re-scaled all relevant forecast data so that they are expressed in 2009 dollar terms.

It should be noted that forecasters were asked to predict nominal defense spending until 1981Q2.\footnote{We thank Tom Stark at the Philadelphia Fed who kindly provided us nominal defense spending data from 1968Q4 to 1981Q2, which are not available on the SPF website.} Since then, they were asked to predict real federal consumption expenditures and gross investment. Following Ramey (2011), we used the GDP deflator median forecasts to convert nominal defense spending forecasts to real defense spending forecasts. We combine the real defense spending forecasts with the real federal spending growth forecasts in order to acquire the data for reasonably long sample period. This seems to be a fairly good approximation for the growth rate forecasts, because they tend to exhibit high degree co-movements.\footnote{Results are available upon requests from authors.} Ramey (2011) also employed a similar approach. In what follows, we study how market agents reformulate their forecasts for the output growth, $y_{SPF,t+j}^{SPF} - y_{SPF,t-1}^{SPF}$ when they revise the forecasts of government spending growth, $g_{SPF,t+j}^{SPF} - g_{SPF,t-1}^{SPF}$.\footnote{We assume these forecasts are formulated utilizing the information set at time $t - 1$, since the current period data such as $y_t$ and $g_t$ are not known at time $t$. Note that forecasters are asked to predict, or nowcast, $y_t$ and $g_t$. Note also that forecasters are asked to predict the values at time $t - 1$ (previous period) because these values are subject to revisions, although their predictions normally stay the same from the previous period.}

### 3.3 Empirical Findings

#### 3.3.1 The Weakening Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus

This section reports an array of the impulse-response function ($IRF_{1,j}$) estimates to a positive 1% structural shock to government spending ($g_t$) as described in (1) and (2). We also report 90% confidence intervals obtained from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations using the
empirical distribution. Our findings below demonstrate that the output effects of fiscal stimulus have become substantially weaker over time.

Figures 2 and 3 present the responses of the GDP \( (gdp_t) \) and the private GDP \( (pgdp_t) \), respectively, to the expansionary government spending shock from a quad-variate VAR with \( x_t = [g_t \ gdp_t(pgdp_t) \ int_t \ mon_t]' \). Specifically, figures in the panel (a) are based on the first 30-year sample period (SP1), 1960Q1 to 1989Q4, while the last 30-year sample period (SP2), 1987Q4 to 2017Q3, was used to generate the IRFs in the panel (b).

It should be noted that the output responses from these sub-sample periods are qualitatively different. The IRF point estimates of the total GDP and the private GDP to the government spending shock are well above zero in SP1 (1960Q1 – 1989Q4), whereas their responses have become substantially muted when we employ data in SP2 (1987Q4 – 2017Q3). Putting it differently, both output responses remain positive for a prolonged period of time in SP1, but their responses become overall negative in SP2. We also note that the private GDP never respond positively to the shock in SP2, implying that initial positive responses of the total GDP simply reflect increases in government spending.

These IRFs imply the possibility of the time-varying effectiveness of fiscal policy in stimulating private activity \( (pgdp_t) \). In other words, the government spending shock seems to have promoted private spending in SP1 but not in SP2.

Motivated by these findings, we further investigate such possibility via repeated VAR model estimations with a fixed-size rolling window scheme described as follows. We use the rolling-window scheme instead of recursive schemes because we are interested in detecting structural changes in the data generating process of \( x_t \).

We begin with an estimation of the VAR model using the first \( T_0 (< T) \) observations, \( \{ x_t \}_{t=1}^{T_0} \). After obtaining the first round set of IRF estimates, we move the sample period window forward by one. That is, new observations at time \( T_0 + 1 \) \( (x_{T_0+1}) \) are added to the sample, but we drop the oldest ones at time \( t = 1 \) \( (x_1) \) to maintain the same size of the sample window. Using \( \{ x_t \}_{t=2}^{T_0+1} \), we estimate the second round set of IRFs. We repeat until we obtain the last round IRFs using \( \{ x_t \}_{T=T_0+1}^{T} \), totalling \( T - T_0 + 1 \) sets of the IRF estimates.

We report our estimates with a 30-year \( (T_0 = 120 \) quarters) fixed-size rolling window in the lower panel of Figures 2 and 3 for the GDP variables. The range of the \( x \)-axis (Date) is from 1989Q4 to 2017Q3, where the fine grid points indicate the ending period of each

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12 The 5th and 95th percentiles of the 500 response function estimates constitute the 90% confidence interval.

13 We also implemented the same analysis with a 20-year window as well as a 40-year window scheme. Results are overall similar and are available upon requests.
rolling window. The $y$-axis (Year) is the time horizon ($j$) of the response function indexed from 0 to 5 years. The $z$-axis is the response ($IRF_{1,j}$) of each variable to a 1% government spending shock.

The surface graphs in the panel (c) of Figures 2 and 3 reveal dramatic decreases in the responses of $gdp_t$ and $pgdp_t$ over time, respectively. Strong positive responses of the GDP variables are rapidly dragged down as more observations are added from later sample periods.

It should be noted that the responses of the private GDP become substantially negative, pushing the total GDP responses toward a negative region, which implies that the weakening stimulus effects of fiscal policy are mainly driven by time-varying responses of private spending.

To highlight these transitions over time, in panel (d) of Figures 2 and 3, we report the responses of the output variables in the short-run to the long-run by dissecting the surface graphs at $y = 0, 2, 5$ (years) of the $y$-axis from the right to the left. Contemporaneous responses (impact; $y = 0$) of $gdp_t$ and $pgdp_t$ do not exhibit substantial variations over time, while the responses in 2 years and in 5 years clearly show a downward trend, implying the substantially diminished effects of fiscal stimulus over time. It is also interesting to see that positive responses of $gdp_t$ on impact ($y = 0$) are due to increases in $g_t$ itself because $pgdp_t$ barely responds when the shock occurs.

**Figures 2 and 3 around here**

Observing these remarkably dramatic changes in private GDP responses over time, we further look into the source of these transitions by investigating the IRFs of the two private spending variables, consumption ($conm_t$) and investment ($invt_t$). In Figures 4 and 5, we report the IRF estimates with $x_t = [g_t \ conm_t \ invt_t \ int_t \ mon_t]'$.

We note a close resemblance between consumption ($conm_t$) responses and those of the private GDP ($pgdp_t$) as can be seen in Figure 4. Consumption increases greatly and significantly over time when $g_t$ shock occurs in SP1. In SP2, however, consumption responses continue to fall to a negative region, although we still observe a weak but positive responses in the very short-run. The surface graph in the panel (c) confirms rapid deteriorations of the consumption responses over time. The panel (d) graph also shows a clear downward trend of the responses of consumption to the spending shock in the medium-run and in the long-run.

On the other hand, investment ($invt_t$) responds overall negatively to the government spending shock as can be seen in Figure 5, although negative responses of $invt_t$ tend to go
deeper as the sample period moves forward. These findings are confirmed by the downward trend in the IRFs in the medium-run as well as in the long-run, whereas initial responses are overall negligible as can be seen in Figure 5(d).

These IRF analyses provide strong evidence that fiscal stimulus has become less effective in stimulating private spending. The positive responses of the private GDP in earlier sample periods are mostly driven by rising consumption given overall negative responses of investment to the shock. On the contrary, fiscal policy has become dramatically ineffective over time. The private GDP ($pgdp_t$) responds mostly negatively to the government spending shock when more recent sample periods are employed, generating completely ineffective stimulus effects of fiscal policy.

Figures 4 and 5 around here

### 3.3.2 Assessing the Role of the Interest Rate under Different Regimes

This subsection empirically assesses the role of the interest rate channel of expansionary fiscal policy shocks under different policy regimes described earlier in our theoretical models. Section 2 demonstrates that government spending shocks generate persistent stimulus effects on private spending only in regime D when the monetary policy stance stays accommodative. The nominal interest rate rises more slowly than the inflation rate, resulting in decreases in the real interest rate, which stimulate private investment as well as consumption.

On the other hand, the nominal interest rate rises faster than the inflation rate in regime H as the central bank maintains its hawkish policy stance to suppress inflationary pressure. The real interest rate rises, which decreases private investment substantially, dominating positive responses of consumption in the short-run. Therefore, fiscal policy fails to stimulate private activity in regime H.

The U.S. post-war data seems to be overall consistent with the theoretical predictions on the output effects of fiscal policy. However, the data shows a very limited role of the interest rate in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. For this purpose, we consider the VAR model (1) with $z_t = [rffr_t \ mon_t]^\prime$, where $rffr_t$ is the ex-post real federal funds rate

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14 We obtain negligible responses of $inv_t$ from the first 30-year sample period, 1960Q1-1989Q4. These seem to be outliers because we obtained qualitatively similar negative responses by shifting the window by just a few years such as 1962Q1-1991Q4.
(FEDFUNDS) accompanied by the log-transformed monetary base. We used the CPI-based inflation rate to obtain the \textit{ex-post} inflation.

Clarida et al. (2000) demonstrated that the Fed had remained dovish (accommodative) during the pre-Volcker era (1960Q1 – 1979Q2), while it had switched to a hawkish monetary policy stance after Paul Volcker’s tenure began in the third quarter of 1979. With the Taylor rule parameter estimates from their work, the New Keynesian model predicts the real interest rate to rise in response to the government spending shock in regime H (post-Volcker era), while it is expected to decline in regime D (pre-Volcker era).

We report empirical evidence that is at odds with these predictions. As can be seen in Figure 6, $rfft_t$ positively responds to the fiscal shock in SP1 (1960Q1 – 1989Q4), while it responds negatively in SP2 (1987Q4 – 2017Q3). Also, the IRFs of $rfft_t$ from the rolling window scheme in the panel (c) and (d) clearly demonstrate a downward trend in all horizons. Recall private investment tends to decline in response to the government spending shock in both regimes. That is, $rfft_t$ and $invt_t$ both decline in response to the fiscal shock in SP2. This implies that private investment must have \textit{shifted} to the left by \textit{exogenous} factors rather than endogenously responding to changes in the real interest rate. We introduce a sentiment channel to explain this possibility of exogenous factors in the next section.

\textbf{Figure 6 around here}

\subsection*{3.3.3 Fiscal Policy Effects on Sentiment}

The role of sentiment as one of potential drivers of macroeconomic fluctuations has long been discussed in the current literature. Hall (1993) and Blanchard (1993), among others, emphasize the causal effects of animal spirit on economic activity, whereas Cochrane (1994) claims that consumer confidence reflects news about changes in economic productivity in the future, which creates a close link between innovations in consumer confidence and subsequent variations in economic activity.

Using a nonlinear state-dependent VAR model, Bachmann and Sims (2012) suggest that the government spending shock can trigger consumer optimism during times of slack, which results in a high fiscal multiplier during recessions. On the other hand, Kim and Jia (2017) demonstrate that the shock is likely to generate consumer \textit{pessimism} in all phases of business cycle when properly detrended data are used.
Recognizing a potentially important role of sentiment, we shift our attention from state-dependent nonlinearity to a time-dependent stochastic process because sentiment responses seem to change over time. For this purpose, we estimate and report the time-varying dynamic adjustments of sentiment in response to the government spending shock, utilizing the VAR model (1) with $\mathbf{z}_t = [int_t \ mon_t \ sent_t]^\prime$. Recall that the location of $sent_t$ in the VAR does not matter for the fiscal policy effects as long as $sent_t$ is placed next to $g_t$. See Christiano et al. (1999) for detailed explanations on this property.

Figure 7 clearly shows qualitatively different responses of sentiment over time. Sentiment ($sent_t$) responds positively to the government spending shock in SP1 (1960Q1 – 1989Q4), while the shock generates consumer pessimism in SP2 (1987Q4 – 2017Q3). The figures in the lower panel exhibit a downward trend especially in the two-year and in the five-year sentiment responses, while a long swing is observed in the contemporaneous responses on impact.

We consider these changes in the response function of $sent_t$ as a clue to understand why the output effects of fiscal stimulus have become weaker over time. Significant stimulating effects of fiscal policy during earlier sample periods are consistent with consumer optimism that results from the government spending shock. On the other hand, it tends to generate consumer pessimism with later observations, decreasing not only investment but also consumption.\footnote{\textit{It might be the case that large sudden increases in government spending are perceived as a confirmation of an incoming recession in near future, generating consumer pessimism, which then results in a decrease in private spending.}}

One possible criticism against this view is the following. Sentiment may simply reflect changes in consumption rather than leading it. This doesn’t seem to be the case especially in SP2. As can be seen in Figure 4(b), consumption initially responds positively for a while when the government spending shock occurs, whereas sentiment starts deteriorating immediately in Figure 7(b). That is, pessimism goes deeper since the impact of the shock. If $sent_t$ simply reflects the changes in $conm_t$, sentiment must have risen at least in the short-run because consumption rises in the short-run. Therefore, sentiment seems to be leading the innovations in consumption rather than passively reflecting innovations in consumption.

In what follows, we implement counterfactual simulation exercises to provide some insights on the importance of this sentiment channel in propagating government spending shocks to private activity.

\textit{Figure 7 around here}
3.3.4 Counterfactual Simulation Exercises

This section implements counterfactual simulation exercises employing the 5-variate VAR model that is used in the previous section, \( x_t = [g_t \ y_t \ int_t \ mon_t \ sent_t]' \). The primary purpose of this exercise is to quantitatively measure the importance of the sentiment channel in the propagation of government spending shocks.

Following Bachmann and Sims (2012), we generate a hypothetical sequence of sentiment shocks that holds sentiment unchanged at all forecast horizons since the impact of the fiscal shock. Putting it differently, we eliminate the indirect output effects of the government spending shock through changes in sentiments that were triggered by the shock. In doing so, one can obtain the hypothetical direct fiscal spending shock effects on private activity.

Our model specification is more general than that of Bachmann and Sims (2012), \( x_t = [g_t \ sent_t \ y_t]' \), in the sense that our system comes with monetary control variables in \( z_t \). Furthermore, we allow sentiment to reflect innovations of all other variables by having \( sent_t \) ordered last.\(^{16}\)

Let \( \bar{F} \) denotes the top-left 5 by 5 sub-matrix of the 5p by 5p companion matrix for the state-space representation. The \( h \)-period ahead impulse-response function of the \( i^{th} \) variable to the structural shock to the \( j^{th} \) variable is given by the following.

\[
\psi_{i,j} (h) = s_i' \bar{F}^{h-1} A_0^{-1} s_j, \tag{3}
\]

where \( s_i \) is a 5 by 1 selection vector, for example, \( s_5 = [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 1]' \).

The contemporaneous sentiment response to a 1% government spending shock \((u_1^g = 1)\) is given by \( s_5' A_0^{-1} s_1 \). To cancel out this response, we generate the following hypothetical sentiment shock,

\[
u_{1}^{sent} = -\frac{s_5' A_0^{-1} s_1}{s_5' A_0^{-1} s_5}, \tag{4}\]

We recursively calculate the sequence of sentiment shocks for the remaining period as follows.

\[
u_{h}^{sent} = -\frac{s_5' \bar{F}^{h-1} A_0^{-1} s_1 + \sum_{r=1}^{h-1} (s_5' \bar{F}^{h-r} A_0^{-1} s_5) \ u_r^{sent}}{s_5' A_0^{-1} s_5}, \quad h = 2, 3, \ldots \tag{5}\]

Finally, we obtain the counterfactual impulse-response function of the \( i^{th} \) variable to the 1%\(^{16}\) However, we obtained qualitatively similar results with alternative ordering as in theirs. All results are available upon request.
fiscal spending shock by the following.

\[ \hat{\psi}_{i,1}(h) = \psi_{i,1}(h) + \sum_{r=1}^{h} \left( s_r^{h-r} A_0^{-1} s_0 \right) u_{sent}^r, \]  

(6)

where \( \psi_{i,1}(h) \) is the unrestricted \( h \)-period ahead impulse-response function.

Figure 8 reports estimated hypothetical response functions (solid lines) \( \hat{\psi}_{i,1}(h) \). Dashed lines are unconstrained impulse-response functions \( \psi_{i,1}(h) \) and their 90% confidence bands from 500 nonparametric bootstrap simulations. As can be seen at the bottom, sentiment responses are completely muted (solid lines) after we add the sequence of hypothetical sentiment shock in (4) and (5).

It should be noted that the structural shifts in the output responses we previously observed has disappeared after we control the endogenous responses of sentiment. Specifically,

1. The private GDP hardly responds to the government spending shock once we neutralize the indirect sentiment effect. That is, we observe virtually no direct effects of fiscal spending shocks on the private GDP \( (pgdp_t) \), implying that positive (or negative) output responses in the private sector have been driven by changes in sentiment.

2. The responses of the total GDP remain practically constant for all horizons, which means that qualitatively different responses of the total GDP over time were driven mainly by \( pgdp_t \) responses. Furthermore, the total GDP responses reflect changes in the public sector components of the GDP only in the absence of meaningful responses of \( pgdp_t \).

Putting it all together, we report substantial and important role of the sentiment channel in propagating fiscal policy shocks to private sector activity. And our simulation exercises demonstrate that changes in sentiment is the driving force of the time-varying effectiveness of fiscal policy.

Figure 8 around here
4 What Explains the Changes in Sentiment?

In this section, we provide statistical inferences about how market participants revise their economic prospects when they receive new information on fiscal actions. For this purpose, we investigate the time-varying relationship between GDP growth forecasts and government spending growth forecasts that are formulated by experts in the private sector, which helps explain the time-varying output effects of fiscal policy via the sentiment channel.

4.1 Understanding Dynamics of Sentiment through the Lens of the SPF

We first study how private agents revise their forecasts of real GDP growth when they update information on real government spending growth. For this purpose, we employ the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) data for the period between 1968Q4 and 2017Q3. We are particularly interested in the relationship between the SPF forecasts of real GDP growth and those of real federal government spending growth.17

Let \( \gamma^{SPF}_{xt}(j + 1) = \gamma^{SPF}_{xt} - \gamma^{SPF}_{xt-1} \) be the SPF growth rate forecast of (logged) \( x_t \) over \( j + 1 \) quarters, while \( \gamma_{xt}(j + 1) = x_{t+j} - x_{t-1} \) denotes the realized counterpart of \( \gamma^{SPF}_{xt}(j + 1) \). We define the SPF forecast errors by \( \hat{\gamma}_{xt}(j + 1) = \gamma^{SPF}_{xt}(j + 1) - \gamma_{xt}(j + 1) \). Note that we do not square or take absolute values of forecast errors as we do for loss functions, because the sign of the errors delivers important information. We first present the SPF forecast errors of real GDP growth over 5 quarters, \( \hat{\gamma}_{yt}(5) \), in Figure 9.18 Some interesting observations are as follows.

Note that private forecasters tend to over-estimate the real GDP growth rate (\( \hat{\gamma}_{yt}(5) > 0 \)) during the pre-Volcker era (1968Q4 – 1979Q2), while they predominantly under-estimate it (\( \hat{\gamma}_{yt}(5) < 0 \)) during the post-Volcker era until the early 2000s. During the 2000s period, the SPF forecasts stay overall optimistic (\( \hat{\gamma}_{yt}(5) > 0 \)) until the beginning of the Great Recession, followed by much weaker but still optimistic forecasts.

We conjecture that these systemic forecast errors are closely related with the structural break in the monetary policy stance suggested by Clarida et al. (2000), who pointed out that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate setting behavior has changed when Paul Volcker took office in the third quarter of 1979. To put it differently, they suggested that the monetary policy

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{17} See the data description section for a detailed explanation on how these data are constructed.} \]
\[ \text{\textsuperscript{18} The vertical line is the break date, which is estimated by the structural break test presented in the next section.} \]
stance had stayed overall accommodative during the pre-Volcker era, while the stance of monetary policy had turned hawkish during the post-Volcker era.

This implies that private forecasters formulated more optimistic GDP growth forecasts when monetary policy was coordinating well with fiscal policy during the pre-Volcker era. On the other hand, it seems that they have formulated more pessimistic GDP growth forecasts during the post-Volcker era when monetary policy stayed hawkish until the beginning of the 2000s. In the early 2000s, Greenspan has initiated an array of aggressive rate cuts to fight the recession triggered by the burst of the so-called dot com bubble in 2001. Such optimism in the early 2000s has become subdued rapidly when the Great Recession began in 2007–2008, but has revived with an array of unconventional dovish monetary policy actions such as quantitative easing and operation twist.

**Figure 9 around here**

We investigate this possibility by examining the time-varying relationship between $\gamma_{gt}^{SPF}(1)$ and $\gamma_{yt}^{SPF}(5)$ via the following least squares (LS) regression over time using a fixed-size rolling window scheme.

$$\gamma_{yt}^{SPF}(5) = \alpha + \beta \gamma_{gt}^{SPF}(1) + \varepsilon_t$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

The motivation of this regression analysis is the following. When market participants receive new information on government spending growth, $\gamma_{gt}^{SPF}(1)$, the realized (actual) patterns of revisions of their real GDP growth forecasts in the future, $\gamma_{yt}^{SPF}(5)$, would reveal their view about the effectiveness of the government spending shock. That is, $\beta$ is likely to be greater when forecasters are optimistic on the effect of fiscal stimulus. As forecasters become less optimistic or even pessimistic, $\beta$ will decrease to zero or even become negative.

Figure 10 presents the LS estimates $\hat{\beta}_{LS}$ for $\beta$ in (7) over time with a 44-quarter fixed size rolling window, that is, the initial point estimate corresponds to $\beta$ from the pre-Volcker era. We also report the 90% confidence bands that are obtained from the normal approximation. This initial $\hat{\beta}_{LS}$ is 0.843, which is significant at the 5% level. However, the $\hat{\beta}_{LS}$ estimate rapidly declines as the sample window starts including observations from the post-Volcker era. Note that confidence bands expand greatly since then, reflecting dramatic changes in $\hat{\beta}_{LS}$ after Mr. Volcker started extremely hawkish anti-inflation policies. This implies that market participants may formulate expectations of a lot weaker and statistically insignificant output effects of fiscal policy when the stance of monetary policy becomes hawkish.
The \( \hat{\beta}_{LS} \) becomes stabilized eventually until it begins rising from the early 2000s, reflecting accommodative monetary policy actions implemented by Mr. Greenspan to fight the recession that began in 2001, followed by the burst of the so-called dot com (IT) bubble. Note that the \( \hat{\beta}_{LS} \) point estimates remain overall high even during the Great Recession as the monetary policy becomes extremely accommodative with three rounds of quantitative easing (QE). However, the confidence bands become wider possibly reflecting high degree uncertainty and the fact that the role of monetary policy has become limited during the zero-lower-bound (ZLB) era. The \( \hat{\beta}_{LS} \) starts falling around the mid 2010s when the Fed began the normalization plan of monetary policy. Putting all together, Figures 8 and 9 provide strong evidence of time-varying sentiment responses to the government spending shock through the lens of the SPF.

Figure 10 around here

### 4.2 Statistical Evidence of Structural Breaks

This subsection presents statistical evidence in favor of our conjectures presented in the previous section, which imply the presence of structural breaks in \( \beta \). For this, we implement structural break tests for (7), employing the test procedure proposed by Hansen (1997, 2001).

Consider the following alternative hypothesis, \( H_A : \beta_1 \neq \beta_2 \), where \( \beta = \beta_1, \ t \in [1, \tau] \) and \( \beta = \beta_2, \ t \in (\tau, T] \), which implies a break at time \( t = \tau \). We obtain the following three statistics proposed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) using the full sample \( (T) \).

\[
\text{Sup}F_T = \sup_{k_1 \leq k \leq k_2} F_T(k)
\]

\[
\text{Exp}F_T = \ln \left( \frac{1}{k_2 - k_1 + 1} \sum_{t=k_1}^{k_2} \exp \left( \frac{1}{2} F_T(k) \right) \right)
\]

\[
\text{Ave}F_T = \frac{1}{k_2 - k_1 + 1} \sum_{t=k_1}^{k_2} F_T(k),
\]

where \( F_T(k) \) denotes the Lagrange Multiplier statistics for the null hypothesis of no structural break, \( H_0 : \beta_1 = \beta_2 \), given a fine candidate grid point \( k \in [k_1, \ k_2] \).

The Chow test is not a feasible option because the structural break date is unknown.

Alternatively, one can use the Wald or Likelihood Ratio test statistics.
trimming parameter values, $k_1 = 0.15T$ and $k_2 = 0.85T$. $p$ values are obtained using the method by Hansen (1997).

As can be seen in Table 2, the three tests in (8) strongly support the presence of a structural break from the full sample, rejecting the null hypothesis of no structural break with virtually zero $p$ values. The Sup$F_T$ test selects 1978Q2 as the identified break date from the full sample, which roughly corresponds to the beginning of the post-Volcker era.

Following the sequential test approach by Hansen (2001), we seek additional break dates in the two subsample periods that are identified by the first structural break date, 1969Q4 – 1978Q2 and 1978Q2 – 2017Q3. We obtained no further evidence of a structural break in both the sub-sample periods even at the 10% significance level, concluding there was a single break in 1978Q2.\(^{21}\)

\textbf{Table 2 around here}

These test results highlight the implications of the systemic patterns of the forecast errors in Figure 9. During the pre-Volcker era that corresponds to regime D in our baseline theoretical model, market participants tend to over-estimate real GDP growth, whereas they formulate their forecasts more pessimistically during the post-Volcker era. These results are also confirmed by the expected output effects ($\beta$) of the government spending shock shown in Figure 10.

Putting all together, empirical findings presented in this section imply that the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus greatly hinges upon the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies through an important role of the sentiment channel. Hawkish monetary policy that conflicts with fiscal stimulus generates consumer pessimism, which ultimately weakens output effects by reducing private spending.

\section{5 Concluding Remarks}

The slow recovery from the recent Great Recession has revived the debate on the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus among the economics profession. Can increases in government spending help stimulate private activity? What variables play a dominant role in propagating government spending shocks to private spending? Empirical evidence is at best mixed, and the profession has failed to reach a consensus.

\(^{21}\)Test results for the earlier period are available upon request.
Motivated by the work of Leeper et al. (2017), we present New Keynesian macroeconomic models that yield strong output effects of fiscal stimulus only when monetary policy coordinates well with fiscal policy. When the central bank responds to inflation aggressively, private spending tends to fall in response to government spending shocks because the central bank raises the interest rate faster than inflation, resulting in an increase in the real interest rate.

Employing the post-war U.S. macroeconomic data, we confirm these predictions about the output effects of fiscal policy. During the pre-Volcker era, the private GDP rises as consumption increases rapidly in response to government spending shocks. Such strong stimulus effects rapidly disappear when the sample period moves to the post-Volcker era. Although the empirical findings are overall consistent with theoretical predictions as to the output effects of fiscal policy, we observe a negligible role of the real interest rate in the propagation mechanism of fiscal stimulus to private spending, which is at odds with New Keynesian models.

The present paper proposes a sentiment channel as an alternative propagation mechanism. We demonstrate sentiment leads innovations in consumption rather than passively reflecting changes in consumption. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show forecasters tend to make systemic forecast errors. More specifically, they were likely to over-estimate (optimism) real GDP growth when monetary and fiscal policies coordinate well with each other. When policies conflict with each other, however, they often formulated more pessimistic forecasts. That is, they were prone to underestimate economic growth in the near future.

We further investigate how forecasters revise their economic prospects when they receive new information on fiscal actions. Our regression analyses with a rolling window scheme demonstrate that positive innovations in government spending tend to trigger more optimistic GDP growth forecasts when monetary policy-makers maintain a dovish stance. When the central bank responds to inflation aggressively, however, forecasters are likely to formulate more pessimistic economic prospects. That is, fiscal stimulus under such circumstances generates pessimism that decreases private spending, ultimately weakening the output effects of fiscal policy. We corroborate our analyses by further providing statistical test results that confirm an important role of the sentiment channel under different regimes of policy coordination.
References


Figure 1. Simulated Impulse Responses to the Government Spending Shock

Note: We report simulated responses over 5 years to a 1% government spending shock in each regime. The monetary authority is assumed to maintain an accommodative stance that coordinates well with expansionary fiscal policy under the Regime D. On the other hand, the central bank maintains a hawkish policy stance that conflicts the dovish stance of the government under the Regime H.
Figure 2. GDP Responses to the Government Spending Shock

(a) 1960Q1 – 1989Q4

(b) 1987Q4 – 2017Q3

(c) 30-year Rolling Window

(d) Time-varying IRFs

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from \( x_t = [g_t, gdp_t, int_t, mon_t]^\prime \) to a 1% government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of the total GDP along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at \( y = 0, 2, 5 \) (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 3. Private GDP Responses to the Government Spending Shock

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from \( \mathbf{x}_t = [g_t, pgdp_t, int_t, mon_t]' \) to a 1% government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of private GDP along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at \( y = 0, \ 2, \ 5 \) (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 4. Consumption Responses to the Government Spending Shock

(a) 1960Q1 – 1989Q4

(b) 1987Q4 – 2017Q3

(c) 30-year Rolling Window

(d) Time-varying IRFs

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from $x_t = [g_t, comm_t, int_t, mon_t]'$ to a 1% government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of consumption along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at $y = 0, 2, 5$ (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 5. Investment Responses to the Government Spending Shock

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from $x_t = [g_t, invt_t, int_t, mon_t]'$ to a 1% government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of investment along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at $y = 0, 2, 5$ (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 6. Real FFR Responses to the Government Spending Shock

(a) 1960Q1 – 1989Q4

(b) 1987Q4 – 2017Q3

(c) 30-year Rolling Window

(d) Time-varying IRFs

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from $x_t = [g_t, gdp_t, rint_t, mon_t]'$ to a 1% government spending shock. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of real interest rate along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at $y = 0, 2, 5$ (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 7. Sentiment Responses to the Government Spending Shock

Note: We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from $x_t = [g_t, gdp_t, rint_t, mon_t, sent_t]'$ to a 1% government spending shock. Note that the location of $sent_t$ is irrelevant given that $g_t$ is placed first. Panel (a) and Panel (b) report the IRF estimates (solid) of sentiment along with its 90% confidence bands (dashed) that were obtained from 500 bootstrap simulations with empirical distributions. Panel (c) reports an array of IRFs to the government spending shock with a 30-year fixed-size rolling window scheme. Panel (d) provides the IRFs in the short- to the long-run by dissecting the surface graph (panel (c)) at $y = 0, 2, 5$ (years) of the year-axis.
Figure 8. Counterfactual Simulation Exercises with Alternative Identification Scheme

*Note:* We report the impulse-response function (IRF) estimates from 5-variate VAR models with $sent_t$ ordered last to a 1% government spending shock. Solid lines are hypothetical response functions with additional sentiment shocks that are designed to hold sentiment unchanged for all forecast horizons. Dashed lines are the impulse-response function point estimate from unconstrained models accompanied by its 90% confidence bands.
Figure 9. SPF Forecast Errors for the Real GDP Growth Rate

Note: We report the 5-quarter ahead SPF forecast errors for the real GDP growth rate. The vertical line represents the break date estimate from SupF_T test.
Figure 10. LS Estimates for $\beta$ with a Fixed Size Rolling Window Scheme

$$\gamma_{gt}^{SPF}(5) = \alpha + \beta \gamma_{gt}^{SPF}(1) + \varepsilon_t$$

Note: We report the LS estimates $\hat{\beta}_{LS}$ for $\beta$ over time with a 44-quarter fixed size rolling window so that the initial point estimate corresponds to the pre-Volcker era (1968Q4 ~ 1979Q3). We obtained the 90% confidence bands (dashed lines) via the normal approximation.
Table 2. Structural Break Tests for $\beta$

$$\gamma_{yt}^{SPF}(5) = \alpha + \beta \gamma_{yt}^{SPF}(1) + \varepsilon_t$$

<table>
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<th>Sample Period</th>
<th>Break Date</th>
<th>Sup$F_T$</th>
<th>Exp$F_T$</th>
<th>Ave$F_T$</th>
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<tr>
<td>1968Q4~2017Q4</td>
<td>1978Q2</td>
<td>19.19</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>7.17</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978Q2~2017Q4</td>
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<td>1.56</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
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<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The regression equation is motivated to understand how forecasters revise their economic forecasts when they update their information on government spending. We employed a sequential structural break test procedure proposed by Hansen (2001). $p-$values are reported in parentheses.
Appendix

This appendix lists the theoretical model, calibrations, equilibrium conditions, steady state, and log-linearized system used for the simulation.

A The Theoretical Model

A.1 Firms and Price Setting

The final good \((y_t)\) is a composite good of a continuum of intermediate goods \((y_{it})\), characterized by a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, 
\[
y_t = \left[ \int_0^1 y_{it}^{(\theta_p-1)/\theta_p} di \right]^{\theta_p/(\theta_p-1)},
\]
where \(\theta_p > 1\) governs the degree of substitution between the inputs. Taken input prices \((P_{it})\) and the output price 
\[
P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_{it}^{1-\theta_p} di \right)^{1/1-\theta_p}
\]
as given, the profit maximization yields the demand for intermediate good \(i\), \(y_{it} = (P_{it}/P_t)^{-\theta_p} y_t\). The intermediate good \(i\) is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm who has the following production function:
\[
y_{it} = (k_{it}^s)^{\alpha} n_{it}^{1-\alpha},
\]
where \(\alpha \in (0, 1)\). \(n_{it}\) and \(k_{it}^s\) denote the level of labor hours and capital services used by firm \(i\), respectively.\(^1\)

Each monopolistically competitive firm solves a two-stage problem. In the first stage, taken input prices \((w_t\) and \(r_{kt}\)), as given, each firm rents labor \((n_{it})\) and capital \((k_{it}^s)\) to minimize its operating cost, \(w_t n_{it} + r_{kt} k_{it}^s\), subject to its production function (1). Cost minimization yields the identical real marginal cost:
\[
m_{it} = \sigma w_{it}^{1-\alpha} (r_{it}^{k_{it}^s})^{\alpha},
\]
where \(\sigma = \left( \frac{1}{1-\alpha} \right)^{1-\alpha} \left( \frac{1}{\alpha} \right)^{\alpha}\). In the second stage, each intermediate goods firm chooses its price \((P_{it})\) to maximize the discounted present value of future profits subject to the demand for \(y_{it}\).

Following the price-setting scheme proposed by Calvo (1983), intermediate firm \(i\) can reset its price \((P_{it}^*)\) with a fixed probability \((1 - \omega_p)\). With probability \(\omega_p\), it partially indexes its price to past inflation according to the following rule:
\[
P_{it} = \pi_{it-1}^{\tau_p} \bar{\pi}^{1-\tau_p} P_{it-1},
\]
where \(\pi_t \equiv \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}\) is the gross inflation rate between \(t - 1\) and \(t\), while \(\bar{\pi}\) is the steady state inflation. Note that indexation is controlled by the parameter \(\tau_p \in [0, 1]\) that allows any combinations of the two types of indexation usually employed in the literature, steady state inflation (e.g., Yun (1996)) and the past inflation rate (e.g., Christiano et al. (2005)). Throughout this paper, variables with a bar denote steady state values.

\(^1k_{it}^s\) is the effective amount of capital, which is introduced in the next section.
The profit maximization problem for firm \( i \) that reoptimizes its price at time \( t \) is:

\[
\max_{P^*_it} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \left( \omega_p \beta^s \right)^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+s}^p P^*_{it}}{P_{t+s}} - mc_{t+s} \right) y_{it+s} \right] \quad (4)
\]

subject to:

\[
y_{it+s} = \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+s}^p P^*_{it}}{P_{t+s}} \right)^{-\theta_p} y_{t+s}
\]

\[
\Xi_{t,s}^p = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{for } s = 0 \\
\Pi_{k=1}^s \pi_{t+k-1}^{\theta_p} \pi_1^{1-\theta_p} & \text{for } s \geq 1
\end{cases}
\]

where the profit at time \( t + s \) is discounted by the pricing kernel \( \beta^s (\lambda_{t+s}/\lambda_t) \) and \( \lambda_t \) is the marginal utility (or shadow price) of wealth of households at time \( t \) that appears in the following subsection. The optimality condition from (4) implies:

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \left( \omega_p \beta^s \right)^s \frac{\lambda_{t+s}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( \frac{\Xi_{t+s}^p P^*_{it}}{P_{t+s}} - \mathcal{M}^p mc_{t+s} \right) y_{it+s} \right] = 0 \quad (5)
\]

where \( \mathcal{M}^p \equiv \frac{\theta_p}{\theta_p - 1} \). The aggregate price index evolves as follows:

\[
1 = (1 - \omega_p) \left( \pi_t^* \right)^{1-\theta_p} + \omega_p \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^{\theta_p} \pi_1^{1-\theta_p}}{\pi_t} \right)^{1-\theta_p} \quad (6)
\]

where \( \pi_t^* = \frac{P^*_{it}}{P_t} \).

### A.2 Households and Wage Setting

There is a continuum of households on the unit interval \([0, 1]\) indexed by \( j \). In addition to hours worked \( (n_{jt}) \), each household \( j \) derives utility from composite consumption \( (c^*_jt) \) which consists of private goods \( (c_{jt}) \) and public goods \( (g_t) \), that is, \( c^*_jt \equiv c_{jt} + \alpha_g g_t \). Parameter \( \alpha_g \) governs the degree of substitutability/complementarity of the consumption goods. When \( \alpha_g < 0 \), private and public consumption are complements (Leeper et al. (2017)), whereas \( \alpha_g > 0 \) implies that these are substitutes with each other (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992); Ambler and Paquet (1996); Finn (1998)). Household \( j \) maximizes the following lifetime utility,

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \ln \left( c^*_jt - hc^*_{t-1} \right) - \frac{\chi n^*_{jt}}{1 + \eta} \right],
\]

where \( \beta \in (0, 1) \) is the discount factor and \( h \in (0, 1) \) denotes the external habit formation parameter. To put it differently, we define the habit stock by a fraction of lagged aggregate consumption \( (hc^*_{t-1}) \). \( \chi \) is the disutility parameter from work and \( 1/\eta \) determines the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.

The household’s real flow budget constraint is given by:

\[
c_{jt} + i_{jt} + \frac{B_{jt}}{P_t} \leq \frac{R_{t-1}B_{jt-1}}{P_t} + (1 - \tau^n) w_{jt} n_{jt} + \left[ (1 - \tau^k) r^k_{jt} u_{jt} - a(u_{jt}) \right] k_{jt-1} + d_{jt} + tr \quad (8)
\]
where the left-hand side represents the uses of income, private consumption \((c_{jt})\), investment \((i_{jt})\), and purchases of nominal government debt \((B_{jt})\) deflated by \(P_t\). The right-hand side denotes the sources of income consisting of real interest payments of government debt, after-tax real wage \((w_{jt})\) and capital rental \((r^k)\) income, dividends distributed by the intermediate goods firms \((d_{jt})\), and constant lump-sum transfer payments \((tr)\) from the government. \(\tau^n\) and \(\tau^k\) are constant tax rates levied on labor income and capital, respectively.\(^2\)

The effective amount of capital services is represented by \(k^s_{jt} \equiv u_{jt}k_{jt-1}\), whereas \(a(u_{jt})k_{jt-1}\) describes the physical cost associated with variations in the degree of capacity utilization, which is parameterized by a quadratic function, \(a(u_{jt}) = \zeta_1(u_{jt} - 1) + \frac{\zeta_2}{2}(u_{jt} - 1)^2\). \(^3\) Note that \(u = 1\) and \(a(1) = 0\) in the steady state. We also define \(a''(1) = \frac{\zeta_2}{1 - \zeta_2}\) following Smets and Wouters (2007).\(^4\)

The law of motion for capital is:

\[
k_{jt} = (1 - \delta) k_{jt-1} + \left[1 - S\left(\frac{i_{jt}}{k_{jt-1}}\right)\right] i_{jt}, \tag{9}
\]

where \(\delta\) is the depreciation rate and \(S(\cdot)\) denotes an adjustment cost function, proposed by Christiano et al. (2005), such that \(S(1) = S'(1) = 0\), and \(\kappa \equiv S''(1) > 0\).

There is a representative, competitive labor agency that hires a continuum of differentiated labor from each household with the following aggregator:

\[
n_t = \left[\int_0^1 n_{jt} \frac{n_{jt} - 1}{\theta w} \, dj\right]^{\frac{\theta w}{\theta w - 1}}, \tag{10}
\]

where \(0 \leq \theta_w < \infty\) is the elasticity of substitution among different types of labor. This competitive labor agency maximizes its profit subject to this production function, taking all differentiated labor wages \((w_{jt})\) and the aggregate wage \((w_t)\) as given, yielding:

\[
n_{jt} = \left(\frac{w_{jt}}{w_t}\right)^{-\theta_w} n_t, \tag{11}
\]

where \(w_t\) is the aggregate real wage that satisfies \(w_t = \left(\int_0^1 w_{jt}^{1-\theta_w} \, dj\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\theta_w}}\).

Following Erceg et al. (2000), wage stickiness is introduced in a way that is analogous to price stickiness described above. In each period, a fraction \(1 - \omega_w\) of households can adjust their wages to \(w^*_t\) and others can only index their wages by past inflation as \(w_{jt} = \pi^m_t \pi^{1-\omega_w} w_{jt-1}\), where indexation is controlled by the parameter \(\omega_w \in [0, 1]\). Therefore, the

---

\(^2\)We assume constant tax rates to focus mainly on the transmission channel of government spending given the tax policy.

\(^3\)Note that we use the end of period stock timing convention. For example, \(k_{t-1}\) is the capital stock that was determined by investment at time \(t - 1\), but is used at time \(t\) in the production function for \(y_t\).

\(^4\)We need this condition to linearize the model presented here.
wage-setting problem of households who reset their wages at time \( t \) can be written as:

\[
\max_{w_{jt}} \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\omega_w \beta)^s U(c_{jt+s}, n_{jt+s})
\]

s.t. \( n_{jt+s} = \left( \frac{\Xi_{t,s} w_{jt}}{w_{t+s}} \right)^{-\theta_w} n_{t+s} \)

\[
\Xi_{t,s} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{for } s = 0 \\
\prod_{k=1}^{s} \bar{\pi}_{t+k-1} \bar{\pi}^{1-i_w} & \text{for } s \geq 1 
\end{cases}
\]

The first order condition associated with this wage-setting problem can be written as:

\[
\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} (\omega_w \beta)^s E_t \left[ \frac{n_{jt+s}}{c_{t+s}} \left( \frac{\Xi_{t,s} w_{jt}}{P_{t+s}} - M^w MRS_{jt+s} \right) \right] = 0
\]

where \( M^w \equiv \frac{\theta_w}{\theta_w - 1} \), \( \bar{c}_{t+s} \equiv c_{t+s} - h c_{t+s-1} \), and \( MRS_{jt+s} \equiv \varrho \tilde{c}_{t+s} n_{jt+s} \) is the relevant marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor hours in period \( t + s \). Therefore, the aggregate wage index is described as follows:

\[
1 = (1 - \omega_w) \left( \pi_{w,t}^* \right)^{1-\theta_w} + \omega_w \left( \frac{\bar{\pi}_{t-1} \bar{\pi}^{1-i_w} w_{t-1}}{\bar{\pi}_t} \right)^{1-\theta_w}
\]

where \( \pi_{w,t}^* = \frac{w_t^*}{w_t} \).

### A.3 Monetary and Fiscal Authorities

The monetary policy follows a Taylor rule. It adjusts the gross nominal interest rate \( (R_t) \) in response to deviations of inflation \( (\pi_t) \) and output \( (y_t) \) from their respective steady state levels:

\[
R_t = R_{t-1}^{\psi_r} \left[ \tilde{R} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\bar{\pi}} \right)^{\phi_x} \left( \frac{y_t}{\bar{y}} \right)^{\phi_y} \right]^{1-\psi_r}
\]

where \( 0 \leq \psi_r < 1 \) is the interest rate smoothing parameter, \( \tilde{R} \) is the equilibrium real interest rate, \( \phi_x \) and \( \phi_y \) are the policy response parameters to the inflation gap and the output gap, respectively.

The government collects tax revenues from capital and labor in addition to its sales of one-period debt to finance its expenditures that include interest payments, government expenditures \( (g_t) \) and transfer payments \( (tr) \). The government’s flow budget constraint is:

\[
\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \tau^n w_t n_t + \tau^k_{t} k_{t} k_{t-1} = \frac{R_{t-1} B_{t-1}}{P_t} + g_t + tr
\]

Government expenditures \( (g_t) \) obey the following stochastic process:

\[
g_t = g_{t-1}^{\psi_g} \left[ \bar{g} \left( \frac{b_{t-1}}{\bar{b}} \right)^{-\gamma_g} \nu_{g,t} \right]^{1-\psi_g}
\]
where the parameter $\psi_g \in (-1, 1)$ governs the degree of the persistence of $g_t$. Following Leeper et al. (2017), we allow government spending to respond to deviations of the (lagged) real debt $b_{t-1} = \frac{b_{t-1}}{P_{t-1}}$ from its steady state value $\bar{b}$. That is, the parameter $\gamma_g > 0$ triggers a correction of government spending when real debt deviates from its steady state value. $\nu_{g,t}$ is a government spending shock, which is assumed to follow a stationary ($\rho_g < 1$) AR(1) process:
\[
\ln \nu_{g,t} = \rho_g \ln \nu_{g,t-1} + \sigma_g \varepsilon_{g,t}, \varepsilon_{g,t} \sim N(0, 1) \quad (18)
\]

### A.4 Market Clearing and Aggregation

We consider a symmetric equilibrium in which all intermediate good firms make identical choices so that the subscript $i$ can be omitted. All goods and asset markets clear in the equilibrium. Specifically, the goods market clear condition requires the following aggregate resource constraint:
\[
y_t = c_t + i_t + g_t + a(u_t)k_{t-1}, \quad (19)
\]
where capital evolves according to the law of motion for capital (9). Equilibrium conditions and their log-linearized equivalents around the deterministic steady state are given in the Appendix. The log-linearized model is solved using the Sims (2002) gensys algorithm.

### B Calibrations

The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency. Regime specific monetary policy parameters are based on the estimates reported by Clarida et al. (2000) to investigate the effects of structural breaks in the Fed’s behavioral equation. Other model parameters are along the lines of research works in the literature or were calibrated using U.S. data over the period 1960Q1 – 2017Q3. Benchmark calibration parameter values are summarized in Table 1.

The discount factor ($\beta$) is set to 0.9958, which equals $(1/T) \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{\pi_t}{(1 + (FFR_t/100))}^{1/4}$ where $T$ is the sample size from the data, $\pi_t$ denotes the quarterly gross inflation rate, and $FFR_t$ is the effective federal funds rate. The inverse Frisch labor supply elasticity $(1/\eta)$ is fixed at 2, which is a common value in the current literature. We set $\delta = 0.025$ for the quarterly depreciation rate for capital that implies an annual depreciation rate of 10%. The disutility parameter $(\chi)$ is an implied parameter that is calibrated with other parameters so that hours worked in the steady state is close to $1/3$ in a model with divisible labor. The habit formation coefficient $(h)$ and the complementarity parameter $(\alpha_g)$ of consumption between private goods and public goods are set to 0.99 and $-0.2$, respectively, which are similar to the ones in Leeper et al. (2017).

The Cobb-Douglas factor share of capital $(\alpha)$ is set to 0.33. The price elasticity of demand for individual good $(\theta_p)$ and the elasticity of substitution among different types of labor $(\theta_w)$ are all calibrated to be 8. The capital utilization rate $(\zeta_2)$ and the adjustment cost

---

5This roughly matches the observation that individuals spend $1/3$ of their time engaged in market activities and $2/3$ of their time in non-market activities. See Hansen (1985).
for investment ($\kappa$) are set to 0.15 and 5, respectively, being consistent with the estimation results in Leeper et al. (2017). The parameters for price stickiness ($\omega_p$) and wage stickiness ($\omega_w$) are both assumed to be 0.8, implying a slightly over one-year average duration of price/labor contracts.

Monetary and fiscal parameters are calibrated based on the mean values from U.S. data over the same sample period in the present paper. The steady state gross quarterly inflation rate ($\bar{\pi}$) is assumed to be 1.0082. The total government spending-to-GDP ratio ($s_g$) is set to 0.0945. The government debt-to-GDP ratio ($s_b$) is 1.3707. The persistence parameter ($\rho_g$) of government spending is assumed to be 0.98. The average labor tax rate ($\tau_n$) is set to 0.2171 and the capital tax rate ($\tau_k$) is 0.2497.

In regime D, the (long run) coefficients on inflation ($\phi_\pi$) and on the output ($\phi_y$) are set to 0.83 and 0.27, respectively, while the interest rate smoothing parameter ($\psi_r$) is assumed to be 0.68. These values are based on the work of Clarida et al. (2000) for the pre-Volcker era that ends right before Paul Volcker took office as the new Federal Reserve chairman in 1979Q3. Government spending is assumed not to respond to the government debt, that is, $\gamma_g$ is set to 0 implying that the fiscal authority also implements their stimulus policies aggressively.

For the specification of regime H, we employ the parameter values from Clarida et al. (2000) for the post-Volcker era. That is, we set $\phi_\pi$, $\phi_y$, and $\psi_r$ to 2.15, 0.93, and 0.79, respectively. The fiscal authority in regime H maintains a less dovish stance than its stance in regime D, implementing mildly expansionary fiscal policy with $\gamma_g = 0.07$. We assume $\rho_g = 0.8$ and $\sigma_g = 0.01$ for the stochastic process of the government spending shock in (18) in both regimes.
Table 1. Parameter Calibrations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference and HHs</th>
<th>β, discount factor</th>
<th>0.9958</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>h, habit formation</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>η, inverse Frisch labor elas.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>̅, steady-state labor</td>
<td>1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>δ, depreciation rate</td>
<td>0.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>αg, subs. of private/public cons.</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frictions and Production</td>
<td>α, capital share</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>θp, elas. of subs. b/w intermediate goods</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>θw, elas. of subs. b/w different types of labor</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ωp, Calvo price stickiness</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ωw, Calvo wage stickiness</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ζ2, capital utilization</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>κ, investment adj. cost</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary/Fiscal Calibrations</td>
<td>̅, steady-state gross inflation rate</td>
<td>1.0082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ψg, lagged resp. for govt spending</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sg, steady-state govt spending-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>0.0945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sb, steady-state debt-to-GDP ratio</td>
<td>1.3707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>̅n, steady-state labor tax rate</td>
<td>0.2171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>̅k, steady-state capital tax rate</td>
<td>0.2497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regime D**

**Monetary Policy**

| φp, interest rate resp. to inflation | 0.83 |
| φy, interest rate resp. to output | 0.27 |
| ψr, resp. to lagged interest rate | 0.68 |

**Fiscal Policy**

| γg, govt spending resp. to debt | 0 |

**Regime H**

**Monetary Policy**

| φp, interest rate resp. to inflation | 2.15 |
| φy, interest rate resp. to output | 0.93 |
| ψr, resp. to lagged interest rate | 0.79 |

**Fiscal Policy**

| γg, govt spending resp. to debt | 0.07 |

**Shocks**

| ρg, govt spending persistence | 0.8 |
| σg, govt spending | 0.01 |

*Note: Parameters are calibrated at a quarterly frequency.*
C Equilibrium Conditions

- The first order conditions of the household

\[
\lambda_t = \frac{1}{c_t^* - h c_{a_{t-1}}}
\]

\[
c_t^* = c_t + \alpha a \phi
\]

\[
R_{t-1} = \beta E_t \left( \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}} \right)
\]

\[
a' (\mu_t) = (1 - \tau^k) r_t^k
\]

\[
q_t = \beta E_t \left\{ \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} \left[ \left( 1 - \tau^k \right) \mu_{t+1} r_{t+1} - a (\mu_{t+1}) + q_{t+1} (1 - \delta) \right] \right\}
\]

\[
1 = q_t \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right) - S' \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right) \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right] + \beta E_t \frac{\lambda_{t+1}}{\lambda_t} S' \left( \frac{i_{t+1}}{i_t} \right) \frac{(i_{t+1})^2}{i_t^2}
\]

\[
\Omega_t = \lambda_t w_t n_t \left( \pi_{w,t}^* \right)^{1-\theta_w} + \omega_w \beta E_t \left( \frac{\pi_{w,t}^* \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) \left( \frac{\pi_{w,t+1}^{\omega_1} w_{t+1}}{\pi_{w,t}^{\omega_1} w_t} \right) \theta_{w(1+\eta)} \Omega_{t+1}
\]

\[
\Omega_t = M \theta (\pi_{w,t}^* \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}) \left( \frac{\pi_{w,t}^* \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) + \left( 1 - \omega_w \right) \left( \pi_{w,t}^* \right)^{1-\theta_w}
\]

- The first order conditions of the firm

\[
0 = (1 - \theta_p) F_{2,t} + \theta_p F_{1,t}
\]

\[
F_{1,t} = \lambda_t m c_t y_t + \omega_p \beta E_t \left( \frac{\pi_{t}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) F_{1,t+1}
\]

\[
F_{2,t} = \lambda_t \pi_{t-1}^{\omega_1} y_t + \omega_p \beta E_t \left( \frac{\pi_{t}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right) F_{2,t+1}
\]

\[
w_t \frac{r_t^k}{r_t} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \frac{\mu_t k_{t-1}}{n_t}
\]

\[
m c_t = \alpha - (1 - \alpha) \alpha^{-1} \omega_t^{1-\alpha} \left( r_t^k \right)^{\alpha}
\]

- The price level evolves:

\[
1 = \omega_p \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega}}{\pi_t} \right)^{1-\theta_p} + \left( 1 - \omega_p \right) \left( \pi_{t}^{\omega_1} \pi_{t-1}^{1-\omega} \pi_{t+1}^{1-\omega} \right)^{1-\theta_p}
\]

- Monetary authority follow its Taylor rule

\[
R_t = (R_{t-1})^{\psi_r} \left[ \tilde{R} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} \right) \phi_w \left( \frac{y_t}{y} \right) \phi_y \right]^{1-\psi_r}
\]
• Government budget constraint:

\[
\frac{B_t}{P_t} + \tau^n w_t n_t + \tau^k \frac{k_t}{k_{t-1}} = \frac{R_{t-1} B_{t-1}}{P_t} + g_t + tr
\]

where

\[g_t = g_{t-1}^{\psi_g} \left[ \bar{g} \left( b_{t-1}/\bar{b} \right)^{\gamma_g} \right]^{1-\psi_g} \nu_{g,t}\]

• Markets clear:

\[
y_t = \frac{(u_t k_{t-1})^\alpha (n_t)^{1-\alpha}}{\xi_{p,t}}
\]

\[y_t = c_t + i_t + g_t + a(u_t) k_{t-1}\]

where

\[a(u_t) = \zeta_1 (u_t - 1) + \frac{\zeta_2}{2} (u_t - 1)^2\]

\[\xi_{p,t} = \omega_p \left( \frac{\pi_{t-1} \pi^{1-\epsilon_p}}{\pi_t} \right)^{-\theta_p} \xi_{p,t-1} + (1 - \omega_p) (\pi^*_t)^{-\theta_p}\]

and

\[k_t = (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} + \left[ 1 - S \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right) \right] i_t\]

\[S \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} \right) = \kappa \left( \frac{i_t}{i_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2\]

• The government spending shock evolves according to

\[\ln \nu_{g,t} = \rho_g \ln \nu_{g,t-1} + \sigma_g \varepsilon_{g,t}\]
D Steady State

Given the steady state labor hours, the steady state inflation rate and the steady state fiscal policy calibration, the remaining variables are defined by the system:

\[ R = \frac{\pi}{\beta} \]
\[ r^k = \frac{\frac{1}{\beta} - (1 - \delta)}{1 - \tau^k} \]
\[ a'(1) = r^k (1 - \tau^k) \]
\[ w = (1 - \alpha) \left[ m_c \left( \frac{\alpha}{r^k} \right)^{\alpha} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \]
\[ k = \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{w^n}{r^k} \]
\[ i = \delta k \]
\[ y = k^\alpha n^{1-\alpha} \]
\[ c = y - i - g \]
\[ tr = \left( 1 - \frac{1}{\beta} \right) b + \tau^n w n + \tau^k r^k k - g \]
\[ c^* = c + \alpha g \]
\[ \lambda = \frac{1}{c^* (1 - h)} \]
\[ m_c = \frac{\theta_p - 1}{\theta_p} \]
\[ \varrho = \frac{w \lambda}{\mathcal{M}n^n} \]
\[ \chi = \varrho (1 - \tau^n) \]
E Log-Linearized System

Let $\hat{x}_t = \ln(x_t/x)$ denote the percentage deviation of a variable $x_t$ from its steady-state $\bar{x}$.

- The first order conditions of the household

\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{\lambda}_t &= -\frac{1}{1-h} \dot{c}_t^* + \frac{h}{1-h} \dot{c}_{t-1}^* \\
\dot{c}_t^* &= \frac{\alpha g}{c + \alpha g} \dot{c}_t + \frac{\alpha g}{c + \alpha g} \dot{g}_t \\
\dot{\lambda}_t &= E_t \dot{\lambda}_{t+1} + \dot{R}_t - E_t \dot{\pi}_{t+1} \\
\dot{r}_k^k &= \frac{\zeta_2}{1-\zeta_2} \dot{u}_t \\
\dot{q}_t &= E_t \dot{q}_{t+1} + \beta (1-\delta) E_t \dot{q}_{t+1} + \beta \left(1 - \tau^k\right) r^k E_t \dot{r}_{t+1} \\
0 &= E_t \dot{q}_{t+1} - \left(1 + \beta\right) \dot{q}_t + \frac{1}{\kappa} \dot{q}_t + \dot{\pi}_{t-1} \\
\dot{\Omega}_t &= \omega_w \dot{\Omega}_{t+1} - \omega_w \beta (1 - \theta_w) \dot{w}_{t+1} - \omega_w \beta (1 - \theta_w) \dot{\pi}_{t+1} - \omega_w \beta (1 - \theta_w) \dot{\pi}_{w,t+1} \\
&\quad+ (1 - \omega_w \beta \theta_w) \dot{w}_t + \omega_w \beta (1 - \theta_w) t_w \dot{\pi}_t + (1 - \theta_w) \dot{\pi}_{w,t} - (1 - \omega_w \beta) \left(\dot{\lambda}_t + \dot{n}_t\right) \\
\dot{\pi}_t &= \omega_w \beta \dot{\pi}_{t+1} + \omega_w \beta \theta_w (1 + \eta) \dot{w}_{t+1} + \omega_w \beta \theta_w (1 + \eta) \dot{\pi}_{t+1} + \omega_w \beta \theta_w (1 + \eta) \dot{\pi}_{w,t+1} \\
&\quad- \omega_w \beta \theta_w (1 + \eta) \dot{w}_t - \omega_w \beta \theta_w (1 + \eta) t_w \dot{\pi}_t - \theta_w (1 + \eta) \dot{\pi}_{w,t} + (1 - \omega_w \beta) (1 + \eta) \dot{n}_t \\
\end{align*}
\]

- The wage index evolves as:

\[
0 = \dot{\pi}_{w,t} - \frac{\omega_w}{1-\omega_w} \dot{w}_t - \frac{\omega_w}{1-\omega_w} \dot{\pi}_t + \frac{\omega_w}{1-\omega_w} \dot{\pi}_{t-1} - \frac{\omega_w t_w}{1-\omega_w} \dot{\pi}_{t-1}
\]

- The first order conditions of the firm

\[
\begin{align*}
0 &= \dot{f}_{1,t} - \dot{f}_{2,t} \\
\dot{f}_{1,t} &= \omega_p \beta E_t \dot{f}_{1,t+1} + \omega_p \beta \theta_p E_t \dot{\pi}_{t+1} - \omega_p \beta \theta_p \dot{t}_p \dot{\pi}_t + (1 - \omega_p \beta) \left(\dot{\lambda}_t + \dot{m} \dot{c}_t + \dot{y}_t\right) \\
\dot{f}_{2,t} &= \omega_p \beta E_t \left(\dot{f}_{2,t+1} - \dot{\pi}_{t+1} \right) - \omega_p \beta (1 - \theta_p) E_t \dot{\pi}_{t+1} + \dot{\pi}_t + \omega_p \beta (1 - \theta_p) \dot{t}_p \dot{\pi}_t \\
&\quad+ (1 - \omega_p \beta) \left(\dot{\lambda}_t + \dot{y}_t\right) \\
\dot{\pi}_t &= \dot{\pi}_t - \dot{\pi}_t - \dot{n}_t + \dot{\pi}_{t-1} \\
\dot{m} \dot{c}_t &= (1 - \alpha) \dot{w}_t + \alpha \dot{r}_k^k
\end{align*}
\]

- The price level evolves:

\[
0 = \dot{\pi}_t - \frac{\omega_p}{1-\omega_p} \dot{\pi}_t + \frac{\omega_p \dot{t}_p}{1-\omega_p} \dot{\pi}_{t-1}
\]

- Monetary authority follows its Taylor rule

\[
\dot{r}_t = (1 - \psi_r) \phi_r \dot{\pi}_t + (1 - \psi_r) \phi_y \dot{y}_t + \psi_r \dot{r}_{t-1}
\]
- Government budget constraint:

\[
\tau^n w_n (\hat{w}_t + \hat{n}_t) + \tau^k r^k k (\hat{r}_t^k + \hat{u}_t) + b \hat{b}_t + \frac{b}{\beta} \hat{n}_t - g \hat{g}_t = \frac{b}{\beta} (\hat{r}_{t-1} + \hat{b}_{t-1}) - \tau^k r^k k \hat{k}_{t-1}
\]

where

\[
\hat{g}_t = \psi_g \hat{g}_{t-1} - \gamma_g (1 - \psi_g) \hat{b}_{t-1} + \hat{\nu}_{g,t}
\]

- Markets clear:

\[
\hat{y}_t = c \hat{c}_t + \hat{i}_t + g \hat{g}_t + (1 - \tau^k) r^k k \hat{u}_t
\]

\[
\hat{y}_t = (1 - \alpha) \hat{n}_t + \alpha \hat{k}_{t-1} + \alpha \hat{u}_t - \hat{\xi}_{p,t}
\]

where

\[
\hat{k}_t = (1 - \delta) \hat{k}_{t-1} + \delta \hat{i}_t
\]

\[
\hat{\xi}_{p,t} = \omega_p \theta_p \hat{n}_t - (1 - \omega_p) \theta_p \hat{p}_{t}^{*} - \omega_p \theta_p \hat{p}_{t} \hat{n}_{t-1} + \omega_p \hat{\xi}_{p,t-1}
\]

- The government spending shock evolves according to

\[
\hat{\nu}_{g,t} = \rho_g \hat{\nu}_{g,t-1} + \sigma_g \epsilon_{g,t}
\]

References


